Strong Comparative Statics of Equilibria

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Issue Date
2003-02Author
Echenique, Federico
Sabarwal, Tarun
Publisher
Elsevier
Type
Article
Article Version
Scholarly/refereed, author accepted manuscript
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
Some results in the monotone comparative statics literature tell us that if a parameter increases,
some old equilibria are smaller than some new equilibria. We give a sufficient condition such that at
a new parameter value every old equilibrium is smaller than every new equilibrium. We also adapt a
standard algorithm to compute a minimal such newer parameter value and apply this algorithm to a
game of network externalities. Our results are independent of a theory of equilibrium selection and
are valid for games of strategic complementarities.
Description
This is the Author's Final Draft. The original published version can be found at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00548-1.
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Citation
Echenique, Federico and Tarun Sabarwal (2003): “Strong Comparative Statics of Equilibria,” Games and Economic Behavior, 42(2), Feb., 307-314. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00548-1
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