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A Normative Pragmatic Model of Making Fear Appeals
dc.contributor.author | Innocenti, Beth | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-11-02T14:53:54Z | |
dc.date.available | 2011-11-02T14:53:54Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Innocenti, Beth. “A Normative Pragmatic Model of Making Fear Appeals.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 44 (2011): 273-90. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1808/8328 | |
dc.description | This is the author's accepted manuscript. The published version is available from Project Muse: http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v044/44.3.innocenti.pdf | |
dc.description.abstract | How do fear appeals generate persuasive force, or reasonably pressure addressees to act as the speaker advocates? Leading models of fear appeals provide partial answers to this question because they locate persuasive force primarily in internal states, such as addressees’ cognitions or emotions. Consequently, they omit key parts of rhetorical transactions such as the speaker, actual message design, and bilateral communication vectors. The normative pragmatic model proposed here provides a more complete account by describing persuasive force in terms of strategies speakers use to design fear appeals. Put simply, fear appeals are designed to (1) make manifest that the speaker has made a responsible assessment of potential fearful outcomes and how to address them; and (2) forestall criticism for poor judgment or fear-mongering. Persuasive force (1) is generated by message design features such as claiming that harmful consequences will occur unless addressees act as the speaker advocates, presenting grounds, and using intense language; and (2) is located in risks and commitments that these design features make manifest. | |
dc.publisher | Penn State University Press | |
dc.relation.isversionof | http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v044/44.3.innocenti.pdf | |
dc.title | A Normative Pragmatic Model of Making Fear Appeals | |
dc.type | Article | |
kusw.kuauthor | Innocenti, Beth | |
kusw.kudepartment | Communication Studies | |
kusw.oastatus | fullparticipation | |
kusw.oaversion | Scholarly/refereed, author accepted manuscript | |
kusw.oapolicy | This item meets KU Open Access policy criteria. | |
dc.rights.accessrights | openAccess |