A Normative Pragmatic Model of Making Fear Appeals

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Issue Date
2011Author
Innocenti, Beth
Publisher
Penn State University Press
Type
Article
Article Version
Scholarly/refereed, author accepted manuscript
Published Version
http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v044/44.3.innocenti.pdfMetadata
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How do fear appeals generate persuasive force, or reasonably pressure addressees to act as the speaker advocates? Leading models of fear appeals provide partial answers to this question
because they locate persuasive force primarily in internal states, such as addressees’ cognitions or
emotions. Consequently, they omit key parts of rhetorical transactions such as the speaker, actual
message design, and bilateral communication vectors. The normative pragmatic model proposed
here provides a more complete account by describing persuasive force in terms of strategies
speakers use to design fear appeals. Put simply, fear appeals are designed to (1) make manifest that
the speaker has made a responsible assessment of potential fearful outcomes and how to address
them; and (2) forestall criticism for poor judgment or fear-mongering. Persuasive force (1) is generated by message design features such as claiming that harmful consequences will occur unless addressees act as the speaker advocates, presenting grounds, and using intense language; and (2) is located in risks and commitments that these design features make manifest.
Description
This is the author's accepted manuscript. The published version is available from Project Muse: http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v044/44.3.innocenti.pdf
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Citation
Innocenti, Beth. “A Normative Pragmatic Model of Making Fear Appeals.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 44 (2011): 273-90.
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