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dc.contributor.authorAsiedu, Elizabeth
dc.contributor.authorVillamil, Anne P.
dc.date.accessioned2005-11-21T19:06:44Z
dc.date.available2005-11-21T19:06:44Z
dc.date.issued2000
dc.identifier.citationAsiedu, E; Villamil, AP. Discount factors and thresholds: Foreign investment when enforcement is imperfect. MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS. Mar 2000. 4(1) : 1-21.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1808/783
dc.description.abstractWe consider a model that provides insight into the well-known Folk theorem in economics that when the discount factor beta is sufficiently close to 1, expropriation will never occur. Although this Folk theorem is true in our model, our perspective is different. The discount factor beta often is described as a "deep structural parameter" that is difficult to alter at a point in time. In contrast, we analyze the determinants of two thresholds <(beta)under bar> and beta* that segment the unit interval on which beta is defined into three subintervals. These subintervals correspond to the three possible equilibria for investment flows: autarky, underinvestment, and unconstrained optimal investment. These thresholds are of interest because they can be altered by specific policy interventions. As a consequence, even if beta is small, some level of foreign investment can be supported. We construct measures of beta for 40 countries, characterize <(beta)under bar> and beta*, and discuss recent trends in investment flows.
dc.format.extent143106 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherCambridge University Press
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/macroeconomic-dynamics/article/discount-factors-and-thresholds-foreign-investment-when-enforcement-is-imperfect/A1EDB5A4AF9F688D82021D2AA396F274#fndtn-information
dc.subjectIntertemporal enforcement
dc.subjectForeign investment
dc.subjectDiscount factor
dc.subjectSovereign debt
dc.subjectRepudiation
dc.subjectWillingness
dc.subjectRisk
dc.subjectFinance
dc.titleDiscount factors and thresholds: Foreign investment when enforcement is imperfect
dc.typeArticle
dc.rights.accessrightsopenAccess


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