Clear Rules—Not Necessarily Simple or Accessible Ones
Issue Date
2011-05-11Author
Mulligan, Lumen N.
Publisher
University of Virginia
Type
Article
Article Version
Scholarly/refereed, publisher version
Version
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1829562
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
In The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1 (2011), Professor Dodson argues that the traditional call for clear and simple rules über alles in subject matter jurisdiction is misplaced. In this response essay, I begin by arguing that Dodson, while offering many valuable insights, does not adequately distinguish between the separate notions of simplicity, clarity, and accessibility. Second, I note that crafting a clarity enhancing rule, even if complex and inaccessible, may be a more promising endeavor than the search for a regime that is at once clear, simple and accessible. In the third section, I contend that a focus on clarity in isolation, in lieu of simplicity or accessibility, both furthers Dodson’s project of illustrating that the value of clarity is often a false idol and reveals the inherently empirical nature of the question. I close by noting that although Dodson’s piece importantly demonstrates that jurisdictional clarity comes at a cost, his inability to resolve these underlying empirical questions makes it unlikely that he will quiet those advocating clarity-based jurisdictional reform.
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Citation
Lumen N. Mulligan, Clear Rules—Not Necessarily Simple or Accessible Ones, 97 Virginia Law Review In Brief 13-22 (2011).
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