Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorJu, Biung-Ghi
dc.date.accessioned2005-04-04T21:01:26Z
dc.date.available2005-04-04T21:01:26Z
dc.date.issued2003-08
dc.identifier.citationJu, BG.Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications.SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE.August 2003.21(1):73-93
dc.identifier.otherISI:000185488100005
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1808/272
dc.description.abstractWe identify general domain properties that induce the non-existence of efficient, strategy-proof, and non-dictatorial rules in the 2-agent exchange economy. Applying these properties, we establish impossibility results in several restricted domains; for example, the intertemporal exchange problem (without saving technology) with preferences represented by the discounted sum of a temporal utility function, the "risk sharing problem" with risk averse expected utility preferences, the CES-preference domain, etc. None of the earlier studies applies to these examples.
dc.format.extent354467 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherSPRINGER-VERLAG
dc.titleStrategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications
dc.typeArticle
dc.rights.accessrightsopenAccess


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record