Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications
dc.contributor.author | Ju, Biung-Ghi | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2005-04-04T21:01:26Z | |
dc.date.available | 2005-04-04T21:01:26Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2003-08 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Ju, BG.Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications.SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE.August 2003.21(1):73-93 | |
dc.identifier.other | ISI:000185488100005 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1808/272 | |
dc.description.abstract | We identify general domain properties that induce the non-existence of efficient, strategy-proof, and non-dictatorial rules in the 2-agent exchange economy. Applying these properties, we establish impossibility results in several restricted domains; for example, the intertemporal exchange problem (without saving technology) with preferences represented by the discounted sum of a temporal utility function, the "risk sharing problem" with risk averse expected utility preferences, the CES-preference domain, etc. None of the earlier studies applies to these examples. | |
dc.format.extent | 354467 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | SPRINGER-VERLAG | |
dc.title | Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications | |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.rights.accessrights | openAccess |