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dc.contributor.authorAkbas, Ferhat
dc.contributor.authorMeschke, Felix
dc.contributor.authorWintoki, M. Babajide
dc.date.accessioned2016-12-20T22:09:18Z
dc.date.available2016-12-20T22:09:18Z
dc.date.issued2016-04-14
dc.identifier.citationAkbas, F., Meschke, F., & Wintoki, M. (2016). Director Networks and Informed Traders. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 62(1), 1-23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2016.03.003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1808/22276
dc.description.abstractWe provide evidence that sophisticated investors like short sellers, option traders, and financial institutions are more informed when trading stocks of companies with more connected board members. For firms with large director networks, the annualized return difference between the highest and lowest quintile of informed trading ranges from 4% to 7.2% compared to the same return difference in firms with less connected directors. Sophisticated investors better predict outcomes of upcoming earnings surprises and firm-specific news sentiment for companies with more connected directors. Changes in board connectedness are positively associated with changes in measures of adverse selection.en_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2378655en_US
dc.subjectDirector networksen_US
dc.subjectShort sellersen_US
dc.subjectShort interesten_US
dc.subjectInformed tradersen_US
dc.subjectEarnings announcementsen_US
dc.titleDirector networks and informed tradersen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
kusw.kuauthorAkbas, Ferhat
kusw.kuauthorMeschke, Felix
kusw.kuauthorWintoki, M. Babajide
kusw.kudepartmentSchool of Businessen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jacceco.2016.03.003en_US
kusw.oaversionScholarly/refereed, author accepted manuscripten_US
kusw.oapolicyThis item meets KU Open Access policy criteria.en_US
dc.rights.accessrightsopenAccess


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