| dc.contributor.author | Dorsey, Dale | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-12-13T17:08:20Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2016-12-13T17:08:20Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015-04 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Dorsey, D. (2015). Objectivity and Perfection in Hume’s Hedonism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 53(2), 245-270. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Retrieved December 2, 2016, from Project MUSE database. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1808/22187 | |
| dc.description.abstract | In this paper, I investigate David Hume’s theory of well-being or prudential
value. That Hume was some sort of hedonist is typically taken for granted in
discussions of his value theory, but I argue that Hume was a hedonist of pathbreaking
sophistication. His hedonism intriguingly blends traditional hedonism with a form of
perfectionism yielding a version of qualitative hedonism that not only solves puzzles
surrounding Hume’s moral theory, but is interesting and important in its own right. | en_US |
| dc.publisher | John Hopkins University Press | en_US |
| dc.subject | Hume | en_US |
| dc.subject | Hedonism | en_US |
| dc.subject | Perfectionism | en_US |
| dc.subject | Well-being | en_US |
| dc.subject | Prudential value | en_US |
| dc.title | Objectivity and Perfection in Hume's Hedonism | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| kusw.kuauthor | Dorsey, Dale | |
| kusw.kudepartment | Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1353/hph.2015.0028 | en_US |
| kusw.oaversion | Scholarly/refereed, publisher version | en_US |
| kusw.oapolicy | This item meets KU Open Access policy criteria. | en_US |
| dc.rights.accessrights | openAccess | |
