Objectivity and Perfection in Hume's Hedonism
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Issue Date
2015-04Author
Dorsey, Dale
Publisher
John Hopkins University Press
Type
Article
Article Version
Scholarly/refereed, publisher version
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
In this paper, I investigate David Hume’s theory of well-being or prudential
value. That Hume was some sort of hedonist is typically taken for granted in
discussions of his value theory, but I argue that Hume was a hedonist of pathbreaking
sophistication. His hedonism intriguingly blends traditional hedonism with a form of
perfectionism yielding a version of qualitative hedonism that not only solves puzzles
surrounding Hume’s moral theory, but is interesting and important in its own right.
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Citation
Dorsey, D. (2015). Objectivity and Perfection in Hume’s Hedonism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 53(2), 245-270. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Retrieved December 2, 2016, from Project MUSE database.
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