dc.contributor.author | Robins, Sarah | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-09-25T20:49:51Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-09-25T20:49:51Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014-01 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Robins, Sarah. "Mindreading and Tacit Knowledge." Cognitive Systems Research 28 (2014): 1-11. doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2013.07.002. | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1808/18518 | |
dc.description | This is the author's final draft. Copyright 2014 Elsevier. | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | Debate over the nature of mindreading proceeds on the assumption that theory and simulation offer distinct characterizations of this ability. The threat of collapse objection questions this assumption, suggesting that simulation collapses into theory because both are committed to mindreading as tacit knowledge. Although both sides dismiss this objection, I argue that the threat is real. Theory and simulation are both accounts of mindreading as tacit knowledge and so the debate between them collapses. | en_US |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_US |
dc.subject | Mindreading | en_US |
dc.subject | Theory-theory | en_US |
dc.subject | Simulation | en_US |
dc.subject | Tacit knowledge | en_US |
dc.title | Mindreading and Tacit Knowledge | en_US |
dc.type | Article | |
kusw.kuauthor | Robins, Sarah | |
kusw.kudepartment | Philosophy | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.cogsys.2013.07.002 | |
kusw.oaversion | Scholarly/refereed, author accepted manuscript | |
kusw.oapolicy | This item meets KU Open Access policy criteria. | |
dc.rights.accessrights | openAccess | |