Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorEarnhart, Dietrich H.
dc.date.accessioned2015-01-26T15:46:31Z
dc.date.available2015-01-26T15:46:31Z
dc.date.issued2000-03-13
dc.identifier.citationEarnhart, Dietrich H. (2000). "Optimal Mix of Penalties in a Principal-Agent Model under Different Institutional Arrangements." Review of Economics and Statistics, 82(4):634-645. http://www.dx.doi.org/10.1162/003465300558975en_US
dc.identifier.issn0034-6535
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1808/16375
dc.descriptionThis is the publisher's version, also available electronically from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/003465300558975#.VMZgUXvGp40en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper uses principal-agent theory to examine the optimal mix of monetary- and resource-based penalties in two institutional settings: a market economy and a centrally planned economy. In a centrally planned economy, an agent's wealth depends mostly on real resources and little on monetary resources; therefore, monetary-based penalties have less penalizing power than do resource-based penalties. Based on this premise, theory generates hypotheses regarding differences in the optimal mix of penalty types between the two economic systems. This paper empirically tests these hypotheses using data from the Czech Republic regarding enforcement responses to water-damaging accidents (such as oil spills).en_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technology Pressen_US
dc.titleOptimal Mix of Penalties in a Principal-Agent Model under Different Institutional Arrangementsen_US
dc.typeArticle
kusw.kuauthorEarnhart, Dietrich H.
kusw.kudepartmentEconomicsen_US
kusw.oanotesPer SHERPA/RoMEO 1/26/15: Pre-print must be accompanied by acknowledgment of acceptance for publication in Journal. On authors website or institutional repository. Publisher copyright and source must be acknowledged. Must link to journal homepage. Publishers' copyright statement must be included. If funding agency rules apply, authors may post articles in PubMed Central immediately after publication, but may be subject to journal embargoes. Publisher's version/PDF must be used for post-print deposit. Includes Journal of Cold War Studiesen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1162/003465300558975
kusw.oaversionScholarly/refereed, publisher version
kusw.oapolicyThis item does not meet KU Open Access policy criteria.
dc.rights.accessrightsopenAccess


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record