Optimal Mix of Penalties in a Principal-Agent Model under Different Institutional Arrangements

Earnhart, Dietrich H.

dc.contributor.author	Earnhart, Dietrich H.
dc.date.accessioned	2015-01-26T15:46:31Z
dc.date.available	2015-01-26T15:46:31Z
dc.date.issued	2000-03-13
dc.identifier.citation	Earnhart, Dietrich H. (2000). "Optimal Mix of Penalties in a Principal-Agent Model under Different Institutional Arrangements." Review of Economics and Statistics, 82(4):634-645. http://www.dx.doi.org/10.1162/003465300558975	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0034-6535
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/1808/16375
dc.description	This is the publisher's version, also available electronically from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/003465300558975#.VMZgUXvGp40	en_US
dc.description.abstract	This paper uses principal-agent theory to examine the optimal mix of monetary- and resource-based penalties in two institutional settings: a market economy and a centrally planned economy. In a centrally planned economy, an agent's wealth depends mostly on real resources and little on monetary resources; therefore, monetary-based penalties have less penalizing power than do resource-based penalties. Based on this premise, theory generates hypotheses regarding differences in the optimal mix of penalty types between the two economic systems. This paper empirically tests these hypotheses using data from the Czech Republic regarding enforcement responses to water-damaging accidents (such as oil spills).	en_US
dc.publisher	Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press	en_US
dc.title	Optimal Mix of Penalties in a Principal-Agent Model under Different Institutional Arrangements	en_US
dc.type	Article
kusw.kuauthor	Earnhart, Dietrich H.
kusw.kudepartment	Economics	en_US
kusw.oanotes	Per SHERPA/RoMEO 1/26/15: Pre-print must be accompanied by acknowledgment of acceptance for publication in Journal. On authors website or institutional repository. Publisher copyright and source must be acknowledged. Must link to journal homepage. Publishers' copyright statement must be included. If funding agency rules apply, authors may post articles in PubMed Central immediately after publication, but may be subject to journal embargoes. Publisher's version/PDF must be used for post-print deposit. Includes Journal of Cold War Studies	en_US
dc.identifier.doi	10.1162/003465300558975
kusw.oaversion	Scholarly/refereed, publisher version
kusw.oapolicy	This item does not meet KU Open Access policy criteria.
dc.rights.accessrights	openAccess

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