dc.contributor.advisor | Bricke, John J. | |
dc.contributor.author | Simmons, Nicholas Keith | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-09-30T19:53:40Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-09-30T19:53:40Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013-05-31 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2013 | |
dc.identifier.other | http://dissertations.umi.com/ku:12700 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1808/12319 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this dissertation, I defend the thesis that qualitative mental states known as qualia (e.g., tastes, feelings, pains) are identical to physical properties. In Chapter 1, I argue that qualia have a functional role in the world, and that is to facilitate non-automatic mental processes. In Chapter 2, I demonstrate how non-reductive accounts of the mind fail. In Chapter 3, I demonstrate how my reductive account fares better than similar accounts with respect to common and contemporary objections. In Chapter 4, I address arguments against any view like mine which seeks to understand qualia in a physicalistic framework. | |
dc.format.extent | 147 pages | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.publisher | University of Kansas | |
dc.rights | This item is protected by copyright and unless otherwise specified the copyright of this thesis/dissertation is held by the author. | |
dc.subject | Philosophy | |
dc.subject | Brain | |
dc.subject | Consciousness | |
dc.subject | Mind | |
dc.subject | Qualia | |
dc.title | Why Sensations Must be Neurological Properties: A Defense of the Identity Theory | |
dc.type | Dissertation | |
dc.contributor.cmtemember | Symons, John | |
dc.contributor.cmtemember | Tuozzo, Thomas | |
dc.contributor.cmtemember | Eggleston, Ben | |
dc.contributor.cmtemember | Vitevitch, Michael | |
dc.thesis.degreeDiscipline | Philosophy | |
dc.thesis.degreeLevel | Ph.D. | |
kusw.oastatus | na | |
kusw.oapolicy | This item does not meet KU Open Access policy criteria. | |
kusw.bibid | 8086109 | |
dc.rights.accessrights | openAccess | |