Why Sensations Must be Neurological Properties: A Defense of the Identity Theory
Issue Date
2013-05-31Author
Simmons, Nicholas Keith
Publisher
University of Kansas
Format
147 pages
Type
Dissertation
Degree Level
Ph.D.
Discipline
Philosophy
Rights
This item is protected by copyright and unless otherwise specified the copyright of this thesis/dissertation is held by the author.
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Show full item recordAbstract
In this dissertation, I defend the thesis that qualitative mental states known as qualia (e.g., tastes, feelings, pains) are identical to physical properties. In Chapter 1, I argue that qualia have a functional role in the world, and that is to facilitate non-automatic mental processes. In Chapter 2, I demonstrate how non-reductive accounts of the mind fail. In Chapter 3, I demonstrate how my reductive account fares better than similar accounts with respect to common and contemporary objections. In Chapter 4, I address arguments against any view like mine which seeks to understand qualia in a physicalistic framework.
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- Philosophy Dissertations and Theses [64]
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