Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorCappelli, Peter
dc.contributor.authorChauvin, Keith
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-11T19:52:22Z
dc.date.available2012-09-11T19:52:22Z
dc.date.issued1991-08
dc.identifier.citationCappelli, Peter, and Kevin Chauvin. (1991) An Interplant Test of the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 769-787. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2937926
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1808/10077
dc.description© 1991 by the President, and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
dc.description.abstractThe analysis that follows tests the shirking model of efficiency wages by examining the relationship between rates of employee discipline and relative wage premiums across plants within the same firm. The structure of this data set controls for many of the problems that confound other tests of efficiency wage arguments, and the results suggest that greater wage premiums are associated with lower levels of shirking as measured by disciplinary dismissals. Shirking and discipline are also lower where conditions in the labor market raise the costs associated with shirking by making it more difficult to find alternative employment. It is less clear, however, whether the wage in this case is necessarily efficient in the sense of generating reductions in discipline sufficient to offset the costs of the wage premium.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technology Press
dc.titleAn Interplant Test of the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis
dc.typeArticle
kusw.kuauthorCapelli, Peter
kusw.kuauthorChauvin, Keith
kusw.kudepartmentBusiness
kusw.oastatusfullparticipation
dc.identifier.doi10.2307/2937926
kusw.oaversionScholarly/refereed, publisher version
kusw.oapolicyThis item meets KU Open Access policy criteria.
dc.rights.accessrightsopenAccess


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record