Winning the Hearts and Minds in Counterinsurgency

Abstract

ABSTRACT Wesley E. Fine M.A. International Studies Department of Global and International Studies, May 2010 University of Kansas This thesis explores how winning the hearts and minds in counterinsurgency is defined and uses David Galula's theory to determine whether the British counterinsurgency approaches in Malaya from 1948-1960 and in Oman from 1965-1975 supports his argument. These cases demonstrate how complex and time consuming a counterinsurgency campaign requires. In both cases innovative ideas and approaches that are regarded as unconventional were key elements to the overall British success in Malaya and in Oman. The most daring and unorthodox approach used by the British in Malaya was the mass relocation of over 500,000 locals to secured areas as an attempt to isolate the insurgent groups from their base support (local populace). Despite the success of the mass relocation it was only one part of a number of moving approaches that were being used to achieve counterinsurgency success. In Oman, the British succeeded in producing an element that was made up of former insurgents and were able to expand its numbers by enticing them with monetary and occupational alternatives. The British approach in Malaya and Oman required a variety of approaches in order for it to succeed. This study suggests that there is not a single method that can be used for counterinsurgency success and that their approaches will continue to vary according to the different scenarios that a counterinsurgent is confronted with. However, all counterinsurgency approaches revolve around the principle of having some form of hearts and minds integrated into the overall plan.