Bargaining in the Chinese Leviathan: An Examination on the Steel Industry after China's SOE Reform

Abstract

This thesis centers on the competitions between enterprises in the steel industry in China after the SOE (state-owned enterprises) reform, which can be viewed as a case for mass economic reforms within Chinese Leviathan. To examine the effect of the SOE reform on the distributional benefits within actors of state-owned and private enterprises, Knight's relative bargaining power theory is served as the theoretic foundation. Ownership, is equally as two other explanatory predictor, labor force proportion and enterprise profit per capita as the operationalization of inputs in gaining asymmetric resource (production capacity quota) for players of enterprises in the steel industry. Empirical results from data collected in field work indicate that (1) ownership matters only when interactive with economic performance and PEs take the advantage of ownership; (2) regardless of ownership, enterprises gain relative bargaining power when they do contribution to the social stability. Qualitative analysis from the interviews in fields also explains the results with cases.