Solving the Bargaining Problem
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Issue Date
1990-01-01Author
Schellenberg, James A.
Publisher
Department of Sociology, University of Kansas
Type
Article
Rights
Copyright (c) Social Thought and Research. For rights questions please contact Editor, Department of Sociology, Social Thought and Research, Fraser Hall, 1415 Jayhawk Blvd, Lawrence, KS 66045.
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
The bargainingproblem is here conceived as determining a point of final agreement in bilateral bargaining situations where there is an overlap in the interests of the parties. Several formal models for describing how persons may solve the bargaining problem (in particular, those of Nash, Kalai and Smorodinsky, and Felsenthal and Diskin) are briefly reviewed, and three experiments are described which seek a comparative test of these models. Experimental results fail to provide clear support for any of these formal models, but they do lead to a more generaldescription of how bargainers tend to arrive at cooperative agreements. This is expressed in terms of the three central considerations of (1) prominence, (2) social efficiency, and (3) equity.
Citation
Mid-American Review of Sociology, Volume 14, Number 1&2 (WINTER, 1990), pp. 77-88 http://dx.doi.org/10.17161/STR.1808.5046
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