| dc.contributor.advisor | Hu, Yaozhong | |
| dc.contributor.author | Dalkir, Elif | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2009-02-02T06:07:35Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2009-02-02T06:07:35Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2008-01-01 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2008 | |
| dc.identifier.other | http://dissertations.umi.com/ku:10103 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1808/4345 | |
| dc.description.abstract | I consider a voting model in which voters receive private signals about a state variable that affects the utility of voters. There is a continuum of signals, normally distributed conditional on the state variable. I characterize a sufficient condition under which there does not exist any asymmetric equilibria. Therefore, for any plurality rule, the unique responsive equilibrium is symmetric. | |
| dc.format.extent | 36 pages | |
| dc.language.iso | EN | |
| dc.publisher | University of Kansas | |
| dc.rights | This item is protected by copyright and unless otherwise specified the copyright of this thesis/dissertation is held by the author. | |
| dc.subject | Mathematics | |
| dc.subject | Economics | |
| dc.subject | Finance | |
| dc.subject | Economic theory | |
| dc.subject | Asymmetric information | |
| dc.subject | Collective decision making | |
| dc.subject | Information aggregation | |
| dc.subject | Responsive bayesian-nash equilibrium | |
| dc.subject | Stability | |
| dc.subject | Strategic voting | |
| dc.title | UNIQUENESS OF RESPONSIVE VOTING EQUILIBRIUM | |
| dc.type | Dissertation | |
| dc.contributor.cmtemember | Barnett, William A | |
| dc.contributor.cmtemember | Nualart, David | |
| dc.contributor.cmtemember | Hui, Rongqin | |
| dc.contributor.cmtemember | Cornet, Bernard | |
| dc.thesis.degreeDiscipline | Special Studies | |
| dc.thesis.degreeLevel | Ph.D. | |
| kusw.oastatus | na | |
| kusw.oapolicy | This item does not meet KU Open Access policy criteria. | |
| kusw.bibid | 6857269 | |
| dc.rights.accessrights | openAccess | |
