MENTAL CAUSATION, INTENTIONAL ACTION AND EXPLANATORY PRACTICE
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Issue Date
2008-06-18Author
Kim, Hyun Chul
Publisher
University of Kansas
Format
217 pages
Type
Dissertation
Degree Level
PH.D.
Discipline
Philosophy
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This item is protected by copyright and unless otherwise specified the copyright of this thesis/dissertation is held by the author.
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The problem of mental causation results from some unwarranted metaphysical assumption: the Principle of Nomological Character of Causality (NCC). However, there is little reason to understand causation in the manner required to make NCC work. The motivation for the demand for laws in action explanations stems at least in part from the fact that the laws cited in explanations are the laws that subsume events in naturalistic causal relations. By rejecting the idea that causal explanation is causal because it is grounded in natural causal relations, the motivation for requiring laws in explanations disappears. I claim that this is the reason why we need to pay attention to our practice and explanatory strategies. By rejecting NCC we can in fact arrive at a sustainable, defensible and rewarding account of mental causation. The primacy of explanatory practice over the ontological commitment reverses such that an explanation is causal if we accept it as such. By reinterpreting the notion of causation we regain the causal efficacy of the mental. We look to a theory of intentional action for help in answering the problem of mental causation. In this work I provide a novel conception of intentional action by distinguishing normative reasons from motivating reasons. The proposal recommends itself as being capable of dealing with many problems, including the problems raised by unintended side effects and lucky actions. More importantly, the proposal is able to deal with the problem of causal deviance and consequently is promising in that it avoids epiphenomenalism of mental properties. I conclude the criteria for intentional action must be wide enough to include the normative perspectives of a third-point of view as well as the psychological perspectives.
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