Normative Sentimentalism and Animal Ethics

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Issue Date
2008-01-09Author
Gerrek, Monica
Publisher
University of Kansas
Format
270 pages
Type
Dissertation
Degree Level
PH.D.
Discipline
Philosophy
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This item is protected by copyright and unless otherwise specified the copyright of this thesis/dissertation is held by the author.
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The purpose of this dissertation is to present what I think is a particularly compelling normative version of sentimentalism. The moral principle which is the foundation of this ethic is: An act, or a failure to act, is morally wrong if and only if it is committed by, contributed to by, or allowed by a moral agent, and both the motive is disapproved of by the impartial spectator and any consequence is disliked by the impartial spectator. I begin this dissertation by explaining and defending the moral principle noted above. I then show how this normative sentimentalist ethic handles the issues raised by factory farming and using animals for research. Next, I present the two most well-known arguments regarding the treatment of animals, Peter Singer's preference utilitarianism and Tom Regan's rights theory, as well as key objections to these theories. I follow this by showing how the version of sentimentalism presented in this dissertation overcomes the objections to the animal ethics of Singer and Regan. To conclude, I address and respond to possible criticisms of the normative sentimentalist theory itself.
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