Two Sides of the Same COIN: A History of the United States and Counterinsurgency During Operation Iraqi Freedom

Abstract

Soon after the United States invaded Iraq in the spring of 2003, it became embroiled in an insurgency that left coalition troops with no choice but to revive, and in many cases reinvent, old counterinsurgency methods. Indeed, contrary to narratives that have suggested the existence of a “turn” to counterinsurgency halfway through the war, the United States’ adoption of counterinsurgency during Operation Iraqi Freedom was actually a slow, incremental process that started in the summer of 2003. This process started with ad hoc, haphazard, grass-roots efforts across the theater of operations. As military leaders increasingly came to recognize the difficulties encountered by troops in Iraq, these efforts progressively expanded, first to the Multi-National Force headquarters in Baghdad, then in military training and education programs states-sides that also stressed the importance of culture in counterinsurgency operations. Counterinsurgency was then enshrined in doctrine with the publication of an interim field manual in 2004. This temporary manual was eventually replaced with a new multi-service publication, better known under its Army denomination FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, in December 2006. A relentless promotion effort surrounded the writing of the multi-service Counterinsurgency field manual and continued well into the second half of the conflict. Tracing this highly effective promotion campaign helps us understand how the military shaped its relations with the American public and civilian branches of the government through its use of the media. This is, therefore, a story of adaptation under pressure that explains how counterinsurgency rose from discarded concept to become the defining doctrine of the war in Iraq.