Constitutional Compliance in Authoritarian Regimes in the Post-Cold War Era

Abstract

This project examines whether or not authoritarian regimes are following the rules outlined in their constitution. Specifically, it studies the constitutional compliance of these constitutions—that is how closely and effectively these regimes follow the rules laid out in their constitution. I theorize that most authoritarian regimes are complying with their constitutional rules, regardless of regime type. Complying with their constitution increases institutionalization and leads to authoritarian resilience. To test my theory, I conduct case studies and create a dataset that measures whether the constitution is being followed within each respective country from 1990 to 2010. This dataset includes indexes measuring the constitutional compliance of executive authority, executive tenure, legislative authority, legislative autonomy, and legislative tenure. These measurements are from twenty-five countries across the world in multiple regions including Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. I find that constitutional compliance does not vary by regime type but instead varies within regime type. This study has important implications for authoritarian governance and resilience.