The Prudential Significance of Care
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Issue Date
2021-05-31Author
Choi, Dong-yong
Publisher
University of Kansas
Format
97 pages
Type
Dissertation
Degree Level
Ph.D.
Discipline
Philosophy
Rights
Copyright held by the author.
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Prudence is a domain of action-evaluation, specifically concerned with the agent herself, in particular, with the agent’s own welfare. For instance, if an agent can benefit either herself or a stranger, then in terms of prudence it is rational that the agent brings out advantages for herself unless she receives larger advantages as a result of benefiting the stranger. A feature of agents is that agents can exist over the course of time. In other words, it could be the case that an agent existed, is existing, and will exist. In regard to this feature of agents, a theory of prudence must be able to explain whether an agent’s welfare at all times is equally important. According to a widely endorsed thesis of prudence (i.e. the temporal neutrality thesis), an agent’s welfare at every moment of life is equally important. An agent’s prudential reason to perform an action does not have a different strength depending on which part of life receives advantages/disadvantages as a result of performing the action. If option X benefits an agent’s far future as much as option Y benefits the agent’s near future, then the agent’s reasons to choose the options have the same strengths. In this dissertation, I suggest an alternative to the temporal neutrality thesis. If an agent either has friendships with or is psychologically related to other people, then in normative domains (e.g. morality and etiquette) the fact that the agent cares for the others is significant in evaluating the agent’s actions. Based on this idea, I suggest the care thesis of prudence. First, I point out that agents have friendships with themselves at other times because agents and themselves at other times care for one another for one another’s sake, and they know this fact about mutual caring. Furthermore, agents are psychologically related to themselves at other times because agents have their current mental states due to their previous mental states, and agents will have certain mental states due to their current mental states. Second, based on these claims of intrapersonal friendship and psychological relation, I contend that the fact that at time T1 an agent cares for herself at time T2 more than for herself at time T3 is important in evaluating whether the agent’s actions at T1 are rational. If at T1 an agent cares for herself at T2 more than for herself at T3, then it could be rational that the agent benefits herself at T2, even if she can bring out larger benefits for herself at T3. After suggesting the care thesis, I argue that the care thesis is a more accurate understanding of prudence than the temporal neutrality thesis. In terms of prudence, it is appropriate that an agent prefers strong pain in the past to mild suffering in the future. The temporal neutrality thesis fails in explaining this phenomenon because, according to the temporal neutrality thesis, an agent’s welfare at all times is equally important. In contrast, the care thesis can justify an agent’s preference for past suffering. It is appropriate that agents prefer pain in the past to suffering in the future because agents care for themselves in the future more than for themselves in the past. The care thesis has a strength in that the care thesis can justify preferences for past suffering. However, critics could say that the care thesis is a problematic view of prudence because, according to this thesis, it could be permissible that an agent enjoys small benefits in the near future at the cost of significant benefits in the far future. In particular, critics could say that enjoying small benefits in the near future at the expense of significant advantages in the far future is a typical example of irrationality. I show that this criticism does not defeat the care thesis because it is rational to enjoy small benefits in the near future even in the case where the agent loses significant benefits in the far future. The structure of this dissertation is as follows: In chapter 1, I explain crucial concepts for this dissertation. In chapter 2, I suggest the care thesis of prudence, and in chapter 3 I show that the care thesis has explanatory power over the temporal neutrality thesis. Finally, in chapter 4, I dismiss the objection that the care thesis is a wrong view of prudence because the care thesis allows an agent to enjoy small benefits in the near future at the cost of significant advantages in the far future.
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