An Interpretation and Defense of Aristotle's Theory of Well-Being

Abstract

Sometimes we are required to help others even if it makes us less well off. Cases in which our personal happiness must be sacrificed for moral duty have long vexed moral philosophers and have been central to discussions about the relationship between morality and happiness. My dissertation explores Aristotle’s approach to this tension, engaging in both interpretation of Aristotle and contemporary debates about the nature of the good life. I argue that Aristotle’s account of perfectionism is both internally coherent and a viable alternative to contemporary forms of perfectionism. First, my dissertation deals with an interpretive conundrum. Scholars disagree about the nature of the relationship between happiness and morality in Aristotle’s theory of the good life. Some claim that the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom, usually referred to as “contemplation”, is the greatest kind of happiness for Aristotle, while others argue that courage, generosity, and other moral virtues are equal to contemplation as intrinsically valuable parts of a happy life. Both of these interpretations are problematic, because they have a difficult time explaining why foundational Aristotelian moral virtues such as courage would be intrinsically valuable or, if not intrinsically valuable, why Aristotle would say that they are always choiceworthy when they seemingly require great sacrifice on our part. In the first three chapters, I examine key passages from Aristotle’s main ethical treatise, Nicomachean Ethics, to explain Aristotle’s view of the relationship between contemplation and moral virtue. Successful interpretation balances Aristotle’s insistence that a) moral virtue is always preferable to vice, b) moral virtue is a kind of rational activity (which Aristotle defines as happiness), c) contemplation is preferable to moral virtue. This seems to be a problem, because if c) is true it is unclear why someone would engage in moral virtue if it conflicted with contemplation; that is, in some circumstances vice would be preferable to virtue, contra a). I argue this inconsistency can be resolved if moral virtue is understood as a kind of rationality that aims at contemplation. Moral virtue is an indispensable tool for living a good life, and thus is worth choosing under certain conditions (even over contemplation). I also maintain that Aristotle believes that human beings have reason to be morally virtuous because they reproduce or are replicated in some way through their families, friends, and broader communities. This is the reason that what appears to be self-sacrifice can be self-interest insofar as other people are other versions of ourselves. Thus, it is possible for Aristotle to believe in a), b), and c). In the last two chapters, I defend the Aristotelian theory of well-being as outlined in the first part of my dissertation against different kinds of contemporary perfectionism. Perfectionists (including Aristotle) believe that happiness involves perfecting human nature but disagree about what kind of activities constitute human perfection. Some Kantian perfectionists, such as David Brink and Christine Korsgaard, hold that human happiness or well-being consists in the activity of rationally determining what makes for a good life. While rationally determining what we should do with our lives is good, it is inherently aimed at a goal: namely, whatever activity the process of rational determination decrees is most worthwhile. Aristotle can offer such an activity because contemplation is terminal and substantive. The final chapter, I also argue against perfectionist theories of the good life that assert that physical activities are in and of themselves valuable. Rather, I argue that physical activities of a certain kind should be understood as a subset of intellectual achievement. Most worthwhile physical activities involve the exercise of cognitive powers that we would associate with contemplation as well. My dissertation thus demonstrates that Aristotle’s ethical theory explains why it can be in our interest to be morally virtuous and shows that it is also a plausible alternative to contemporary perfectionisms.