| dc.description.abstract | The purpose of this work is primarily to defend the Thomistic approach to well-being on three fronts. First, it is often said that objective theories of well-being are vulnerable to the objection that, if well-being is objective, someone’s good might not sufficiently resonate with him or her. That is, objectivist theories suffer because they fail to meet the “internalist” constraint. I argue, however, that a Thomistic theory of well-being—objective though it is—is not vulnerable to this criticism. Second, it has been argued that perfectionist theories of well-being (like Aquinas’) cannot accommodate the intuition that pleasure and “cheap thrills” positively contribute to human well-being. I argue that a Thomistic theory of well-being can indeed affirm the intrinsic goodness of pleasure and “cheap thrills.” Finally, I argue—against the objections of other scholars—that a singular analysis of relational goodness (i.e. x is good for y) is possible. This singular analysis is grounded in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and, I believe, can helpfully inform our discussions about human well-being. | |
