Procuring the Cross of Iron: The Effect of Congressional Approval on the U.S. Defense Budget

Abstract

Understanding why we spend is an essential step in controlling and justifying the U.S. defense budget. Renewed study may grant perspective on the journey U.S. defense spending has taken over the last 40 years, and provide clues to what lies ahead. This dissertation examines the impact of congressional approval on U.S. defense spending through time series analysis of the period 1970 - 2015. The interaction between public approval and congressional action is viewed through the lens of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (Jones, 2001) and is a departure from classical incrementalism (Key, 1940; Wildavsky, 1964, 1975, 2004) traditionally associated with budgets. Other key drivers, such as public opinion on the sufficiency of the defense budget, the presence of war and economic health are included in the model to isolate causation and interaction, but the focus is on the significant impact of congressional approval to punctuations in defense spending both during and outside periods of war and severe economic turmoil. The defense budget represents over half of all discretionary spending, and produces economic impacts in every state and virtually every congressional district. The scale, salience and extensibility of the defense budget offer a tempting target for Congress to provide quick stimulus to the electorate on a scale impossible with any other single appropriation. Whether motivated by fear of potential foreign enemies, nationalistic pride, concern for service members, or economic advantage, the defense budget is as close to a bipartisan priority as can be found in U.S. society. The defense budget is a useful tool for Members of Congress to influence individual and institutional public approval and one that is regularly utilized both within and without time of war or economic extremis to garner constituency support.