Coping with Crisis: Military Government Officials, U.S. Policy, and the Occupation of Bavaria, 1945-1949

Abstract

This dissertation explores the implementation of American policy in postwar Germany from the perspective of military government officers and other occupation officials in the Land of Bavaria. It addresses three main questions: How did American military government officials, as part of the institution of the Office of Military Government, Bavaria (OMGB), respond to the challenges of the occupation? How did these individuals interact with American policy towards defeated Germany? And, finally, how did the challenges of postwar Germany shape that relationship with American policy? To answer these questions, this project focuses on the actions of military government officers and officials within OMGB from 1945 through 1949. Operating from this perspective, this dissertation argues that American officials in Bavaria possessed a complicated, often contradictory, relationship with official policy towards postwar Germany. Early in the occupation, Bavarian military government challenged or worked to mitigate the effects of American policy that promoted a harsh, deconstructive peace. At other times, however, military government officials implemented official policy, simply adapting it to the circumstances of postwar Bavaria. Policy implementation in Bavaria, therefore, was not a straight-forward matter, but was characterized by a series of challenges that complicated attempts to turn official directives and plans into reality. Ultimately, this dissertation operates on the belief that it is vitally important to understand the challenges associated with policy implementation, particularly if nation-building remains a part of American foreign policy in the future. Future policy should be based on an accurate understanding of past experiences, including the role of low-level officials in implementing policy and the challenges associated with putting official directives into action.