ORGANISMS AND THE EXTENDED SELF: A RE-EVALUATION

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Issue Date
2016-05-31Author
Carlyle, Arthur Carlyle
Publisher
University of Kansas
Format
23 pages
Type
Thesis
Degree Level
M.A.
Discipline
Philosophy
Rights
Copyright held by the author.
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
In this paper I argue against Eric Olson, who argues that the extended mind thesis must be false if animalism—the view that human persons are numerically identical with biological organisms—is true. Whilst I agree with Olson that the animalist’s approach is the best account of personal identity, I disagree with his position regarding the extended mind thesis. I argue, contrary to Olson, that understanding human beings as organisms leads to the acceptance of a version of the EST. This is important also, as it shows that one need not have any commitments to the EMT to accept the EST.
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- Philosophy Dissertations and Theses [64]
- Theses [3769]
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