CONFLICT, CORRUPTION, AND CONSENT: AN ANALYSIS OF POPULAR SUPPORT IN AFGHANISTAN

Abstract

Who cares about corruption in conflict? Afghans do. This dissertation considers the intersection of governmental support and corruption during periods of instability. Although there are studies connecting popular support to corruption, only a few studies have linked an operationalized concept of corruption to instability. None of these have attempted to contextualize corruption based on local norms to determine whether their definition measures behaviors that would be considered problematic by the populace. This case study of Afghanistan provides a unique opportunity to open the black box of instability and analyze the impact of corruption on governmental support during an active conflict for control of the government. Using two waves of survey data from December 2008 and March 2009, I first identify the different types of corruption that are viewed as a serious problem by Afghans. I find evidence for types of corruption that cause losses and emotional duress have a greater negative impact on perceptions of corruption as serious problem. I then consider how these particularly salient aspects of corruption influence support for the Afghan national government and an external actor, the International Security Assistance Force lead by the United States, which requires popular support in its efforts to defeat the Taliban insurgency. I find evidence to suggest that corruption causes not only diminished support for the government, but can also lead the population to switch their support to the opposing side. Finally, I consider the effect of government performance, as well as the perceptions of corruption across government levels, on support for ISAF and its efforts to resolve the conflict. I find that government actions do affect popular opinion of the external counterinsurgent force, especially corrupt behavior by agents most closely associated with ISAF. Further, perceived trustworthiness and respect for cultural practices significantly impact support for the external counterinsurgents. These findings have important implications for the priority that international interventions should place on corruption and its local reputation.