The Bourbon Reform of Spanish Absolutism: The Government of the Crown of Aragon, 1665-1746

Abstract

This study of early modern governing practices analyzes the rule of Philip V of Spain (1700-1724, 1724-1746) in relation to his predecessor, the Habsburg Charles II (1665-1700) and his grandfather, Louis XIV of France (1643-1715). Philip creatively engaged the legacy of both monarchs to create a unique set of governing practices that centralized his authority while also maintaining a significant degree of variation in how he related to his subjects based on their social and political standing. Philip followed a particularist model that allowed him to give specific concessions and privileges only to the subjects who requested them. This approach to governing resulted in an ad-hoc administrative and legal patchwork rife with irregularities, but it circumvented the unavoidable problems of replacing multiple complex systems throughout his kingdoms with a uniform legal system. While Philip's reforms left some subjects dissatisfied with his reign, it enabled him to cultivate support among elite groups in his towns and kingdoms, securing his rule in the aftermath of the War of Spanish Succession (1705-1714). The advantages of particularism can be seen in comparison with eighteenth century France, where greater centralization and administrative uniformity created long-term problems that eventually resulted in the French Revolution. The Spanish model, while usually deemed less successful than that of the French, avoided some of the problems that led to the revolution while simultaneously minimizing royal debt. These findings challenge dominant interpretations of state formation in early modern Europe, suggesting that rulers could rationally choose policies that increased administrative and legal fragmentation.