Institutional Control of the Armed Forces in Nigeria's Fourth Republic

Abstract

This study examines civil-military relations in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. It aims to determine the challenges of institutionalizing civilian control over the armed forces in the country and the consequences of failure for the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria. Since the return to Civil Rule by many African states late in the twentieth century, African leaders have employed various strategies to “coup-proof” their armed forces. There is increasing acknowledgement by experts, however, that if emerging democratic states in Africa are to consolidate their democracies, civilian control will have to move beyond simply “coup-proofing” the military to the adoption of institutional mechanisms for control. This thesis analyzes Nigeria’s legislature and Ministry of Defense, two institutions responsible for the development of institutional control in the country’s fledgling democracy. It finds that multiple factors are responsible for weak institutional control in the Fourth Republic. These include the lack of knowledge by civilian leaders of military affairs, weak democratic practices within the institutions due to pervasive corruption, and the lack of political will by civilian leaders to institutionalize civilian control effectively. Moreover, this study also examines Nigeria’s civil society. While not an institution, it too plays a key role in institutionalizing control. Similar to the formal institutions, civil society’s contribution is also weakened by its lack of knowledge of the military. All of these factors have allowed the military to maintain its privileges in the post-military period. Weak institutional control in the Fourth Republic also negatively affects the armed forces, as it has reduced the forces’ effectiveness to address the security challenges that Nigeria has encountered since the return to Civil Rule in 1999.