European Union Democratic and Institutional Deficits
Issue Date
2015-12-31Author
Bratcher, Aaron
Publisher
University of Kansas
Format
70 pages
Type
Thesis
Degree Level
M.A.
Discipline
Global and International Studies, Center for
Rights
Copyright held by the author.
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Abstract: Electoral campaigns in Europe exist on two distinct levels, the traditional national level and the newer supranational European level. Do voters view these two distinct levels as independent actors or do their opinions of one level influence their views of the other? The pre-existing “democracy deficit” in the European Union seems to have been exacerbated by the fallout of the financial crisis and subsequent sovereign debt crises and endless rounds of austerity. The unpopularity of these savage austerity measures seemingly imposed by distant, faceless and unaccountable institutions, it is said, is leading to extreme fringe parties gaining mainstream acceptance in European political systems, endangering the European democracy and the world economy. This paper uses Eurobarometer public opinion surveys in member countries to measure citizens’ levels of trust in their national government, as well as trust in European Union institutions. Data before and after the financial crisis is available, providing an opportunity to study public reactions over an extended period of time. The descriptive analysis suggests that in addition to a very real democracy deficit in “old” Europe (the West and South) an institutional deficit exists in the former Communist bloc nations; wherein their citizens’ trust level in Europe is unrelated to trust levels in their national government. They trust the supranational EU more than their own governments, giving a new wrinkle to research of European public opinion.
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