Miscommunication and Misunderstanding: Eisenhower, IRBMs, and Nuclear Weapons in the NATO Alliance

Abstract

President Dwight D. Eisenhower's New Look security policy put nuclear weapons at the forefront of U.S. defense efforts. Due to the lack of an effective Intercontinental Ballistic Missile in the mid-1950s, the U.S. required European cooperation to launch an attack on the Soviet Union. This dissertation reveals the difficulties of the New Look defense policy regarding missile development, allied cooperation, and an almost singular focus on Europe as the primary area of concern for U.S. and allied security. These difficulties arose from bureaucratic infighting between the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, tensions between the U.S., U.K., and France, and the overarching threat of an all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower did not have an easy task in balancing these competing interests and this study reveals the importance for U.S. political leaders to understand the impact of defense issues not only on U.S. interests but also allied regional and strategic priorities.