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The Primitive Thesis: Defending a Davidsonian Conception of Truth
dc.contributor.advisor | Bricke, John | |
dc.contributor.author | Clarke, Justin Robert | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-12-02T23:59:39Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-12-02T23:59:39Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015-05-31 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2015 | |
dc.identifier.other | http://dissertations.umi.com/ku:14047 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1808/19024 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this dissertation I defend the claim, long held by Donald Davidson, that truth is a primitive concept that cannot be correctly or informatively defined in terms of more basic concepts. To this end I articulate the history of the primitive thesis in the 20th century, working through early Moore, Russell, and Frege, and provide improved interpretations of their reasons for advancing and (in the cases of Moore and Russell) eventually abandoning the primitive thesis. I show the importance of slingshot-style arguments in the work of Frege, Church, Davidson, and Gödel for resisting certain versions of the correspondence theory of truth. I argue that most slingshots fail to convincingly establish a collapsing conclusion, but that a Gödelian version of the slingshot is terminal to certain varieties of the correspondence theory of truth. I then provide a Davidsonian theory of truth and interpretation that is consistent with and makes use of the primitive thesis. Finally, I provide an account of predication, properties, and universals that I argue is both serviceable and consistent with Davidson’s overall program. | |
dc.format.extent | 130 pages | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.publisher | University of Kansas | |
dc.rights | Copyright held by the author. | |
dc.subject | Philosophy | |
dc.subject | Metaphysics | |
dc.subject | Donald Davidson | |
dc.subject | Epistemology | |
dc.subject | Philosophy of Language | |
dc.subject | Theories of Truth | |
dc.subject | Truthmaker Theory | |
dc.title | The Primitive Thesis: Defending a Davidsonian Conception of Truth | |
dc.type | Dissertation | |
dc.contributor.cmtemember | Dorsey, Dale | |
dc.contributor.cmtemember | Nutting, Eileen | |
dc.contributor.cmtemember | Symons, John | |
dc.contributor.cmtemember | Pye, Clifton | |
dc.thesis.degreeDiscipline | Philosophy | |
dc.thesis.degreeLevel | Ph.D. | |
dc.identifier.orcid | https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4083-3990 | |
dc.rights.accessrights | openAccess |
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Dissertations [4889]
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Philosophy Dissertations and Theses [64]