Veto Players, Punctuated Equilibria, and Budgetary Dymanics: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, United Kingdom, and Denmark

Abstract

Punctuated equilibrium and veto player theories are both well-established political science models. Punctuated equilibrium theory is a model of the public policy process which holds that policy changes typically occur in an incremental fashion, but this equilibrium incremental change is subject to periods of significant and sudden punctuated change. Veto player theory holds that when more individuals and groups in political systems must give their consent for policy change to occur (i.e., they possess "veto powers"), change will be slower and less dramatic. This analysis borrows from the punctuated equilibrium model developed by Baumgartner and Jones and the veto player model developed by Tsebelis to analyze the history of budgetary changes in the United States, United Kingdom, and Denmark. The results suggest that veto players play an important role in Denmark, though due to unique partisan and institutional characteristics of the Danish political system, the relationship is the opposite of the hypothesized one. More veto players appear to actually make budgets more volatile, rather than increasing stability as the veto player-punctuated equilibrium hybrid model developed in this paper would predict. Overall, however, the results do not line up particularly well with the main hypothesis.