Metaphysics and Natural Kinds: Slingshots, Fundamentality, and Causal Structure
Issue Date
2014-08-31Author
McFarland, Andrew
Publisher
University of Kansas
Format
147 pages
Type
Dissertation
Degree Level
Ph.D.
Discipline
Philosophy
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This item is protected by copyright and unless otherwise specified the copyright of this thesis/dissertation is held by the author.
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My dissertation addresses a question relevant to metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science: What are natural kinds? I explore a view that holds that natural kinds are complex, structural properties that involve causal structure. Causal structure describes the idea that for the many properties associated with natural kinds, these properties are nomically linked - that is causally connected - in such a way that the properties of non-natural kinds are not. After criticizing arguments in favor of a nominalist theory of kinds - one that holds that a natural kind just is to be identified with its class of instances - and after defending the notion of a complex structural property from several prominent objections posed by David Lewis, I apply a causal account of natural kinds to a set of problematic cases, paying special attention to isomeric kinds from chemistry.
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