FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY STABILITY: THE ROLE OF FEDERALISM IN VETO PLAYERS THEORY
Issue Date
2014-05-31Author
Daehler, William Lawrence
Publisher
University of Kansas
Format
82 pages
Type
Thesis
Degree Level
M.A.
Discipline
Political Science
Rights
This item is protected by copyright and unless otherwise specified the copyright of this thesis/dissertation is held by the author.
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Show full item recordAbstract
The veto players theory claims that there are institutional and partisan actors, individual or collective, that act as veto points in the process of legislation. Each veto point must give its consent for a new law to pass, thus altering the status quo. This study investigates the role of federalism, which is generally characterized by bicameralism and a decentralized state, as a veto player in 20 OECD states. The results suggest federal institutions do act as important veto points and affect the liklihood of changes to a status quo. OLS regressions and event history analyses, using methods borrowed from Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998), demonstrate the pivotal role federal institutions play in promoting status quo policies.
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- Political Science Dissertations and Theses [134]
- Theses [3942]
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