dc.contributor.author | Dorsey, Dale | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-06-23T17:10:13Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-08-07T12:10:04Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013-08 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Dale Dorsey. (2013). The Supererogatory, and How to Accommodate It. Utilitas 25(3):355-382. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S095382081200060X | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0953-8208 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1808/14290 | |
dc.description | This is the publisher's version, also available electronically from http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8984941&fileId=S095382081200060X | |
dc.description.abstract | Many find it plausible to posit a category of supererogatory actions. But the supererogatory resists easy analysis. Traditionally, supererogatory actions are characterized as actions that are morally good, but not morally required; actions that go ‘beyond’ the call of our moral obligations. As I shall argue in this article, however, the traditional analysis can be accepted only by a view with troubling consequences concerning the structure of the moral point of view. I propose a different analysis that is extensionally correct, avoids the problems of the traditional view, and, incidentally, also defuses any objection to act-consequentialism, or any other first-order moral theory, on grounds that it cannot accommodate the supererogatory. | |
dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press | |
dc.title | The Supererogatory, and How to Accommodate It | |
dc.type | Article | |
kusw.kuauthor | Dorsey, Dale | |
kusw.kudepartment | Philosophy | |
kusw.oastatus | fullparticipation | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1017/S095382081200060X | |
kusw.oaversion | Scholarly/refereed, publisher version | |
kusw.oapolicy | This item meets KU Open Access policy criteria. | |
dc.rights.accessrights | openAccess | |