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dc.contributor.advisorBricke, John J.
dc.contributor.authorBaize, Micah J.
dc.date.accessioned2012-10-28T17:22:39Z
dc.date.available2012-10-28T17:22:39Z
dc.date.issued2012-05-31
dc.date.submitted2012
dc.identifier.otherhttp://dissertations.umi.com/ku:12044
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1808/10326
dc.description.abstractThere has been significant and continued debate over the nature and truth of Bernard Williams’s internalism. My aim is to resolve much of the dispute over both of those issues by providing a new interpretation of his internalism--the reasonsH interpretation. To explain the new interpretation I make a distinction between there being a reason to perform an action (a reasonE) and an agent having a reason to perform an action (a reasonH). For an agent to have a reason to perform an action, it must be within the agent’s capacity to perform the action for that reason. According to the reasonsH interpretation, internalism is the claim that in order for an agent to have a reason, it must be within the agent’s capacity to be motivated to perform the action. An important consequence of this interpretation is that externalists with respect to the previous interpretations can consistently accept the truth of internalism on the reasonsH interpretation. To support the accuracy of this new interpretation of Williams’s internalism, in Chapter 1 I argue that the predominant interpretations are problematic because they inconsistent with one of two claims which are most likely essential to a correct interpretation. In Chapter 2 I then provide a detailed explanation of the reasonsH interpretation as well as three considerations which together strongly support the plausibility of it as a correct interpretation. Chapter 3 completes the argument that the reasonsH interpretation is the most charitable interpretation with respect to Williams's argument against external reasons. In Chapter 4 I defend the truth of internalism against various objections that have been raised against the doctrine. Lastly, in Chapter 5 I will show that the same concern which underlies Williams's explanation and defense of internalism is the same concern which is the basis for his rejection of the “morality system”--a particular conception of morality which he addresses in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.
dc.format.extent209 pages
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherUniversity of Kansas
dc.rightsThis item is protected by copyright and unless otherwise specified the copyright of this thesis/dissertation is held by the author.
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.subjectWilliams, Bernard
dc.subjectInternalism
dc.subjectPractical reason
dc.subjectReasons for action
dc.titleBernard Williams's Internalism: A New Interpretation
dc.typeDissertation
dc.contributor.cmtememberDorsey, Dale
dc.contributor.cmtememberEggleston, Ben
dc.contributor.cmtememberDe George, Richard
dc.contributor.cmtememberCarlson, Maria
dc.thesis.degreeDisciplinePhilosophy
dc.thesis.degreeLevelPh.D.
kusw.oastatusna
kusw.oapolicyThis item does not meet KU Open Access policy criteria.
dc.rights.accessrightsopenAccess


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