THREE ESSAYS ON MONITORING OF FINANCIAL REPORTING BY CORPORATE DIRECTORS

Abstract

Recent high-profile financial scandals and increasing instances of restatements focus public attention on the role of audit committees, auditors and CFOs in maintaining the integrity and quality of corporate financial reporting. The U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in July 2002, and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc. (Nasdaq) changed their listing requirements in 2004 to encourage more effective corporate governance in order to protect the integrity of the financial reporting system. The purpose of my dissertation is to examine monitoring of financial reporting by corporate directors. My dissertation, entitled "Three Essay on Monitoring of Financial Reporting by Corporate Directors" examines how boards strengthen corporate governance through the formation of audit committees, the choice of external auditors, and the hiring of new CFOs. Study one proposes and tests two models explaining what factors affect the existence of designated audit committees and the extent of audit committee financial expertise at IPOs. Study two investigates factors impacting IPO firms' choice of an industry expert audit. Study three examines whether restatement companies experiencing chief financial officer (CFO) turnover hire new CFOs with more financial expertise.