PEIRCE, MEAD, AND THE OBJECTIVITY OF MEANING
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Issue Date
1972-10-01Author
Lewis, J. David
Publisher
Department of Sociology, University of Kansas
Type
Article
Rights
Copyright (c) Social Thought and Research. For rights questions please contact Editor, Department of Sociology, Social Thought and Research, Fraser Hall, 1415 Jayhawk Blvd, Lawrence, KS 66045.
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This paper shows parallelisms between the philosophies of George H. Mead and Charles S. Peirce. Because they both view cognition from the social realist's perspective, they independently developed equivalent triadic theories of meaning. It is further argued that their pragmatic account of meaning logically leads to belief in the objectivity and communality of truth and scientific knowledge. This reveals their opposition to the nominalistic and individualistic view of truth and knowledge sometimes embraced in contemporary sociology of knowledge.
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Citation
Kansas Journal of Sociology, Volume 8, Number 2 (FALL, 1972), pp. 111-122 http://dx.doi.org/10.17161/STR.1808.4766
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