dc.contributor.author | Toth, W. Scott | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-05-27T13:36:33Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-05-27T13:36:33Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1988-01-01 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1808/13742 | |
dc.description | This is the published version. | |
dc.description.abstract | The United States Supreme Court has continuously attempted to define the scope of allowable police interrogation practices. One question that frequently arises is whether particular police conduct amounts to interrogation within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona. The Court recently confronted this issue in Arizona v. Mauro. In Mauro, the Court held that a defendant was not interrogated within the meaning of Miranda when police allowed his wife to speak with him in the presence of an officer who tape-recorded their conversation. This Note will assess Mauro in light of the Court's prior decisions. | |
dc.publisher | University of Kansas School of Law, Criminal Justice Clinic | |
dc.title | Defining Interrogation Under Miranda: Arizona v. Mauro | |
dc.type | Article | |
kusw.kuauthor | Toth, W. Scott | |
kusw.kudepartment | Law | |
kusw.oastatus | na | |
kusw.oaversion | Scholarly/refereed, publisher version | |
kusw.oapolicy | This item does not meet KU Open Access policy criteria. | |
dc.rights.accessrights | openAccess | |