Dorsey, Dale2016-12-132016-12-132015-04Dorsey, D. (2015). Objectivity and Perfection in Hume’s Hedonism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 53(2), 245-270. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Retrieved December 2, 2016, from Project MUSE database.https://hdl.handle.net/1808/22187In this paper, I investigate David Hume’s theory of well-being or prudential value. That Hume was some sort of hedonist is typically taken for granted in discussions of his value theory, but I argue that Hume was a hedonist of pathbreaking sophistication. His hedonism intriguingly blends traditional hedonism with a form of perfectionism yielding a version of qualitative hedonism that not only solves puzzles surrounding Hume’s moral theory, but is interesting and important in its own right.HumeHedonismPerfectionismWell-beingPrudential valueArticle10.1353/hph.2015.0028openAccess