

RELIGIOSITY, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND LEBANON AND MOROCCO

BY

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Abstract: This study addresses the relationship between religiosity and freedom of speech. While a growing body of research advances the now established notion that Islam as a religion in practice at the individual level is compatible with democracy, this work attempts a more nuanced analysis at the individual level concerning Muslim attitudes and views concerning the right of freedom of speech. Findings obtained through bivariate comparisons of the Arab Barometer Wave I survey results of Morocco and Lebanon, show that religiosity does not predict antagonistic views towards freedom of speech. Findings support arguments that posit no relation between Islam as a religion or Muslim's interpretation of Islam necessarily leading to anti-democratic or anti-freedom of speech sentiments. This work also used bivariate comparisons to analyze the relationship between authoritarianism and freedom of speech. As expected, authoritarian comparisons produced significant predictable statistical results. Authoritarians in both countries, unsurprisingly, were very supportive of their governments, and as a result, they were more comfortable with freedom of speech and open to diverse ideas in their countries than their non-authoritarian counterparts. In contrast, non-authoritarians were supportive of democracy and freedom of speech in theory, but were highly skeptical and even antagonistic to both, when applied to their countries' political environment. These seemingly contradictory results are mitigated when contextual factors are brought into focus. Type of government and center of power were argued as the important potential contextual factors influencing these authoritarian results. The major conclusions are: Individual religiosity is not a predictor of negative attitudes towards freedom of expression and authoritarianism seems to predict a more negative relationship with freedom of speech. Additionally, when attempting to generalize statistical findings, one must take into account all contextual and environmental factors that affect the site of analysis.

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I. Introduction

In 2005, the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published twelve cartoon depictions of Muhammed, the prophet of Islam, as a challenge to what those at the paper claimed were illegitimate religious demands.¹ Protesters from Muslim communities, both peaceful and violent, voiced their displeasure for the depictions of Muhammed, an act some suggest is forbidden.² Whether it was a peaceful protest in Lebanon, the threat of ending diplomatic ties with Denmark by Libya and Saudi Arabia, or support for the printing of the images on freedom of speech grounds, the cartoons represent the complexities of freedom of expression and freedom of speech.³ Muslim social integration, assimilation and acceptance in predominantly non-Muslim countries, anger towards Western-friendly leaders in majority Muslim nations, have all been posited as explanations for the widespread anger.⁴ Although pinpointing a single cause remains impossible, these explanations are representative of the conflict regarding different understandings: ideas and definitions of rights possessed by those supportive of democracy and democratic values. Regardless of the freedom of speech issue, the publication and subsequent backlash necessitates further examination of the values of freedom of expression in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

¹ Heiko Henkel, "Fundamentally Danish? The Muhammad Cartoon Crisis as Transnational Drama," *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge* 8, no. 2 (2010): 67.

² "15,000 protest in London against cartoons," *Associated Press, The Guardian*, February 18, 2006, www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/18/muhammadcartoons. Lydia Polgreen, "Nigeria Counts 100 Deaths Over Danish Caricatures," *The New York Times*, February 24, 2006. Declan Walsh and John Aglionby, "Churches ablaze as protests continue across globe," *The Guardian*, February 19, 2006, www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/20/pakistan.muhammadcartoons.

³ "Freedom of speech" and "freedom of expression" are used interchangeably in this work. While the author understands the differences between two, those distinctions are not the focus of this work.

⁴ Henkel, 67-82. Aamer Ahmed Khan, "Hidden Motives Behind Cartoon Protests," *BBC News*, February 15, 2006 www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4716762.stm.

The Muhammad cartoons are not the only incident which could be related to Islam and freedom of speech. Similar protests and anger erupted after the release of the 2012 movie trailer, *Innocence of Muslims*. It is clear that the subject of freedom of speech will continue to be central as people and countries wrestle with competing ideas about basic human rights and values, and while the religious and the non-religious maintain somewhat competing views of what are the limits of freedom of speech and the acceptable role of religion. Freedom of speech and religion is not the only topic of conversation concerning citizens of the MENA, but it is an extremely relevant one as rapid democratic political change occurs throughout the region

The topic of freedom of expression in relation to the individual practice of Islam is not new or unique, but the outrage over the cartoon depictions of Muhammad may reveal the lack of understanding of how these concepts relate in some predominantly Muslim regions of the world. This work will examine several important questions regarding religion and wider democratic values. Is religion the most important factor in understanding attitudes toward freedom of expression? Is the outrage observed over the publication of the Muhammad cartoons really a function of religiosity? Answering these questions will help in understanding the relationship between individual religiosity and freedom of speech. Knowledge that will help ensure a more nuanced understanding of Muslims, which is why this work represents an important addition to the research as it concerns democratic attitudes of individual Muslims. Rather than a function of religiosity, I show and argue that other factors, including authoritarianism, demographics and other contextual factors, influence attitudes towards freedom of speech more so than religiosity.

To understand religious individuals' relationship with democracy, it is important to focus not on democracy as a system but democracy in practice. While ideas about democracy vary,

basic civil and political rights are an essential part. Such rights can include freedom of movement, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and of course, freedom of religion. While there has been a significant amount of research on the relationships between Islam in practice and democracy, there has been relatively little focus on attitudes towards freedom of speech and freedom of expression. Which is why this analysis represents an important addition to the subject.

II. Islam, Religiosity and Democracy in the MENA

While a handful of MENA countries have removed the yoke of dictatorship, the results have been disappointing. The most recent Freedom House country ratings of the MENA do not reveal a compelling argument for the future of democracy in the region. Of the twenty-one countries in the MENA comprising 350 million individuals, only one country, Israel, is considered free.⁵ Except for intermittent years in Lebanon, all Arabic-speaking countries are considered partly free or not free.⁶

For decades the MENA was exceptionally undemocratic, and authoritarian rule was the hallmark of the region.⁷ A litany of reasons have been put forth to explain the failure to democratize, including the lack of prerequisites to democracy (e.g., a market driven economy, adequate income and literacy levels, democratic neighbors, history of democracy), willing repressive ap-

⁵ Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2013*, Available online at: www.freedomhouse.org.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics* (2004): 139-157.

paratases, culture, weakness of civil society, and of course, Islam.⁸ Historically, Islam has been a reoccurring explanation for persistent authoritarianism.

Islam as an abstract and ambiguous system of beliefs has been traditionally understood as antagonistic to democracy.⁹ The argument is as follows: for Muslims, the past is ever-present and more influential than any present conditions. The character of predominantly Muslim societies is still guided by a remote and foundational historic period.¹⁰ Muslims are viewed as monolithic and unchanged from their past, a past that has defined them, without any possibility of change in their lives and society.¹¹ These explanations, however, have failed to see the obvious transitions in Muslims societies.¹² Modern institutions such as nation states, modern bureaucracies, political parties, elected parliaments, labor unions, corporations, associations, educational systems—as in most any advanced democratic nation—have formed throughout the MENA and other predominantly Muslim nations.¹³ To suggest that predominantly Muslim cultures and societies remain essentially unchanged from their distant past is clearly not taking account of these developments. In fact, these aforementioned institutional developments have a longer unbroken history of existence, than some “modern” Western democratic nations.¹⁴ Furthermore, as recent-

⁸ Bellin, 139-141.

⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* (1993): 22-49.

¹⁰ Abdou Filali-Ansary, "Muslims and Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 10, no. 3 (1999): 18, 19.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹² *Ibid.*, 20-22.

¹³ This list is cited directly from Abdou Filali-Ansary's, (1999), "Muslims and Democracy."

¹⁴ Both Greece and Portugal, both of which have been under military rule as recent as the 1970s and both of which have constitutions which are less than forty years old.

ly as the 1950s, Catholicism was considered incompatible with democracy, and yet this position appears rather foolish today.¹⁵

Even what was conventionally thought a permanent feature of religious belief in the MENA, Islam's antagonism towards democracy, or even a religious individuals' negative relationship with freedom of speech, need not be permanent fixtures.¹⁶ Generalizations such as these appear unrelated to a number of recent findings that found few antagonistic results between Islam practiced at the individual level, and democracy. Recent research literature on the MENA reveals important conclusions concerning the influence of religion and religiosity.¹⁷

Using survey data, scholars have developed a deeper understanding of democratic values and attitudes in the predominantly Muslim nations of the MENA.¹⁸ In particular, the work of Mark Tessler and coauthors have found that being Muslim does not necessarily impact political attitudes as what is claimed by some.¹⁹ Those with the "strongest Islamic attachments" are not automatically less supportive of democracy.²⁰ While some like Samuel Huntington (1993) and Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom and Gizem Arikan (2012) have argued to the contrary, Tessler's work sug-

¹⁵ Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53, no. 1 (1959): 92, 93. It is important to note that this work is in no way claiming Catholicism and Islam are the same. This comment is made within the context that views about major world religions change.

¹⁶ Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *The Atlantic Monthly* 266, no. 3 (1990): 47-60.

¹⁷ Tessler, Mark, "Do Islamic Orientations Influence Attitudes Toward Democracy in the Arab World? Evidence from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 43 no. 3-5 (2002): 339.

¹⁸ For general world data, see Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart's, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics*, (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 149. And see Tim Niblock's, "Democratization: A Theoretical and Practical Debate," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 25 no. 2 (1999): 221-233.

¹⁹ Tessler (2002). And, Mark A. Tessler, and Eleanor Gao, "Gauging Arab Support for Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 3 (2005): 83-97. And, Amaney A. Jamal, and Mark A. Tessler, "Attitudes in the Arab world," *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 1 (2008): 97-110.

²⁰ Tessler, (2002), 349.

gests that Islam should not *necessarily* be singled-out in an analysis of the region. His work has found no empirical relationship between Islamic attachments and attitudes towards democracy.²¹

In addition to being no more or less in favor of democracy, being strongly religious and Muslim is not a predictor of wide variance as it relates to civic values. Data shows those favoring democratic systems both Islamic and secular, are no more likely to be a religious Muslim or secular individual. Predispositions of both the religious Muslim and the secular individual (willingness to be politically active, adherence to self-expressive values like personal trust, and tolerance) are overwhelmingly similar.²²

Responses reveal encouraging findings regarding democratic political culture in the MENA. Respondents were supportive of gender equality (except in relationship to women as leaders), are religiously tolerant, and believe respect for diversity of ideas is an important characteristic of an elected leader.²³ While these are hopeful results, low levels of interpersonal trust and civic participation and only a “moderate level of political interest and knowledge” hamper democratic growth.²⁴ Furthermore, a near consensus of people believes Islam and democracy to be compatible.²⁵

As an aside, something rarely mentioned is that religiosity can represent a “positive” effect on “civic skills, leading individuals to actively engage in politics and hold more positive atti-

²¹ Huntington, 22-49. And, Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom and Gizem Arikan, “A Two-edged Sword: The Differential Effect of Religious Belief and Religious Social Context on Attitudes towards Democracy,” *Political Behavior* 34, (2012). And, Tessler, (2002), 349.

²² Tessler, (2010), 221, 230, 231.

²³ *Ibid.*, 238.

²⁴ Tessler, 238.

²⁵ Jamal and Tessler, 99.

tudes towards democracy.”²⁶ Others contend that “religious belief increases value-driven ambivalence towards democracy, while involvement in religious social networks decreases.”²⁷ Results suggest the strength of one’s belief and the extent of one’s involvement in religious social networks determines one’s ambivalence and relationship with democratic values.

Islam may not predicate negative relationships with democracy and civil rights that are associated with it, but there are naturally some relevant variables, which do predict negative relationships towards democracy. One such factor is authoritarianism, which refers to an individual’s near unyielding support for those in power and generally anti-democratic attitudes. Authoritarians generally do not hold egalitarian attitudes, are intolerant, and do not value freedom of expression. Something Daphna Canetti-Nisim’s (2004) findings have shown to be true, specifically in regards to freedom of expression.

Canetti-Nisim agrees with Tessler’s previously cited work, that religion does not predict negative attitudes towards democracy nor democratic rights.²⁸ Using Ben-Meir and Kedem’s Religiosity Index²⁹ and Altemeyer’s Scale for authoritarianism³⁰ she found that support for de-

²⁶ Bloom and Arikan, 250.

²⁷ Ibid., 251.

²⁸ Daphna Canetti-Nisim, “The Effect of Religiosity on Endorsement of Democratic Values: The Mediating Influence of Authoritarianism,” *Political Behavior* 26, no. 4 (2004): 377, 378.

²⁹ Ibid., 381, 382. For cited religiosity index see, Ben-Meir Y. and Kedem P. “Religiosity Index for the Jewish Population in Israel,” *Megamot* 24: 353-362 (Hebrew).

³⁰ Ibid., 382. For cited authoritarianism scale see Bob Altemeyer’s, *Enemies of Freedom: Understanding Right-wing Authoritarianism*, Jossey-Bass, 1988.

mocratic values was only negative where authoritarianism existed in the individual.³¹ Using these scales, “the association between religiosity and democratic values is almost entirely mediated by authoritarianism” and authoritarianism is more likely a predictor of “intolerance than religiosity.”³² Since tolerance is assumed to be an essential component of democracy, authoritarians natural tendency towards intolerance increases their likelihood of holding anti-democratic attitudes. While the religious by their nature of being religious show deference to authority and are more likely to be authoritarian, all religious individuals are not authoritarian and therefore do not necessarily have negative attitudes towards freedom of speech.³³

Since authoritarian traits play a role of significance in individual attitudes towards freedom of speech, it necessitates analysis. As noted above, religion and authoritarianism *can* play an important role in how one relates to democratic values, but what are other significant variables? Gender, religious freedom and state regulation of religions, in addition to attitudes held by individuals in post-communist contexts in relation to democracy, are variables highlighted in the literature as important determinants of an individual’s democratic values.

³¹ Ibid., 382, 383. For cited democratic values scales see the following. Yuchtman-Yaar, E. and Peres, Y, *Between Consent and Dissent: Democracy and Peace in the Israeli Mind* (2000). And, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, and Kaase, M. (1971), *Demokratische Einstellung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, In R Wildenman (ed.), *Sozialwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch für Politik*, (2), 119-326. And, Miller, Helsi and Reisinger’s 1995 study of democratic values in the United States.

³² Canetti-Nisim, (2004), 387. John Duckitt and Farre Belinda, “Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Political Intolerance among Whites in the Future Majority-rule South Africa,” *Journal of Social Psychology* 134, (1994):735-741. And Bob Altemeyer, , *The Authoritarian Specter*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 1996). And, Bruce Hunsberger, “Religion and Prejudice: The Role of Religious Fundamentalism, Quest, and Right-wing Authoritarianism,” *Journal of Social Issues* 51, (1995): 113-129. Canetti-Nisim and Beit-Hallahmi, 369. Fathali M. Moghaddam, and Vuk Vuksanovic, “Attitudes and Behavior Toward Human Rights Across Different Contexts: The Role of Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Political Ideology, and Religiosity,” *International Journal of Psychology* 25, no. 2 (1990): 455-474.

³³ Canetti-Nisim, (2004), 388.

Tessler (2002) finds that personal piety and Islamic attachments found among female respondents, are statistically important in explaining negative attitudes toward democracy.³⁴

Women in Arab-Muslim countries were more likely to take direction from religion and religious authorities, than men, in relationship to politics. With these findings, females who are more supportive of religious influence than men are not rejecting democracy, rather they possess a more favorable view of the “justice and protection of the weak” they associate with Islamic practice, and potentially understand the strength of arguments based in Islam.³⁵ Another pattern relates to “guidance in economic and commercial affairs.”³⁶

This economic pattern is the inverse relationship between the desire for Islamic guidance in economic and commercial affairs, and pro-democracy attitudes among women. It is suggested that women unhappy with their current economics are more supportive of policies “guided by the values they associate with Islam” such as “justice, equality, social welfare, and protection of the weak,” and all personal values relating to the family.³⁷ Gender-linked effects reveal the importance of demographic considerations when analyzing individual attitudes towards democracy and democratic values.

Regional and national contextual factors like a nation’s religious freedoms or state regulation of religion, possession of a higher Freedom House rating, and post-Communist nations support for democracy, have been suggested as possible determinants for one’s relationship with

³⁴ Tessler, (2002), 348, 349.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid., 349.

³⁷ Ibid.

democracy and democratic values.³⁸ Nations with higher levels of religious freedom are less supportive of democracy in their country context but more supportive of democracy in general.³⁹ State regulation has no relationship with individual support for democracy, “but (it has) a positive effect on endorsement of the democratic system.”⁴⁰ Individuals living in countries possessing higher Freedom House ratings and or are post-communist are more critical of democracy,⁴¹ in part due to secularizing effects communism has on these nations, and economic stagnation viewed by many as a direct result of the political and economic liberalization of post-communist societies.⁴² The over-secularization characterizing post-communist societies may increase the probability of citizen reliance upon government. Consequently, they are less supportive of a system they now rely on so heavily. Displeasure with democracy in relation to economic failures may be a natural outworking of the democratization process, as people attach the idea of improved economic lives to democratic governance. Potentially, unhappiness concerning economic factors may influence outrage over forms of speech they see as further marginalizing their economic potentials

Other interesting findings show an inconsistency in how the individual believes human and democratic rights should be viewed and applied to different country contexts. In research conducted by Fathali M. Moghaddam and Vuk Vuksanovic (1990), respondents were more con-

³⁸ Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart. “The Role of Ordinary People in the Democratization Process,” *Journal of Democracy* 19, no.1 (2008): 126-240. 126, 128.

³⁹ Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan, 263.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*, (Cambridge University Press, 2005): 67, 82, 109.

cerned with “basic” lower order rights in the developing world. Basic standards of living were viewed as more important than higher-order democratic values, like freedom of expression. This uneven application reveals a failure in the *universality* principle of human rights.⁴³ Individuals surveyed were more likely to support human rights in the developing world rather than in their own.⁴⁴

Inconsistencies such as these reveal an important element when one is interpreting attitudes towards democracy, freedom of expression and responses to the Muhammad cartoons. The failure in universal application helps researchers understand how respondents define, interpret and apply abstract concepts such as freedom of expression. This may help explain that while many gathered in protest of the publication of the Muhammad cartoons; each person could use the same event to voice their own unrelated displeasure or grievance. Interestingly, while protests over the publishing of unpopular cartoons, or negative portrayals of Muhammad in movie trailers like, *Innocence of Muslims*, were widespread, they were not necessarily representative of all Muslims. To assume all Muslims felt this way employs a monolithic approach to religion and people. Additionally, there are number of issues each protester could have had to motivate them to take to the streets to voice their displeasure. All parties involved may be quite supportive of speech in general. Still, they may believe these forms of speech are not within acceptable bounds of public discourse. No matter one’s stance, context certainly influences their position on the issue.

⁴³ Moghaddam and Vuksanovic, 458, 471.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 455-474.

III. Freedom of Expression

Freedom of expression is a right that includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media, regardless of location.⁴⁵ Freedom of speech and freedom of the press are fundamental elements to ensuring human dignity and they are part of the full realization of a broader set of self-expressive values. Before analyzing relationships between religiosity and freedom of speech, one must research the country and regional contexts. Geographical location plays an important role in how individuals form and shape their attitudes towards speech. Having a grasp on the broader regional relationships to freedom of speech, usually manifested in the government relations with the press, informs the researcher's ability to analyze smaller individual level relationships.

Freedom of Expression in the MENA

Authoritarian regimes by their nature expect and require citizens to obey, almost blindly, their policy and governance, and any attempt to broaden or expand free speech protections would likely be resisted, as it increases opportunity for criticism of their authoritarian practices. Given the authoritarian nature of MENA regimes, press freedoms and freedom of expression would be expected to be heavily censored, and repressed.

According to Freedom House, the region is comprised of twenty-one countries and territories.⁴⁶ Freedom House country level freedom of expression scores range from 0-100, with

⁴⁵ United Nations, "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights," Available online at: www.un.org.

⁴⁶ Freedom House, "Middle East and North Africa," Available online at: www.freedomhouse.org.

0-30 considered *Free*, 31-60 *Partly-Free* and 61-100 indicating *Not Free*.⁴⁷ The average global rating since 2002 is 46.5, and 44.0 without the MENA, which corresponds to the rating, Partly Free. In contrast to the world average, the MENA has an astonishingly high average of 69.0, reflecting the region's Not Free status with regards to freedom of the press.

The regional average since the advent of the Arab Spring went down from 71.0 to 68.3 reflecting only marginal improvements in freedom of expression rights and press freedom. Nevertheless, for all the nations whose long-standing authoritarian leaders were removed, each saw, at the very least, a small improvement in their press freedom ratings.

For Arab Spring nations, the average rating was 81 in 2010. Since that time the rating improved, dropping to 71 in 2013. Whereas the MENA nations, without significant regime change during that same time, saw their rating worsen from 66.5 in 2010 to 67.1 following the advent of the Arab Spring. The six Arab Spring nations experienced a decrease of 12% overall in comparison to the regional average, without Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen, which increased by about 1%. In fact, Libya and Tunisia, as a percentage and absolute value change, saw the most dramatic improvement, both regionally and globally.

According to Freedom House ratings, all but one of the MENA nations are Not Free. These results could reinforce age-old assumptions and generalizations about the region and its culture's (i.e., Islam's) compatibility with democracy. As such, the debate regarding Islamic practice and democracy remains at the forefront of discussions of freedom of expression in the

⁴⁷ While Freedom House ratings are based upon numerous sources, in general they do weight government legislation heavily, which creates the appearance of freedom, but for the individual, little has changed (Welzel and Inglehart, 2008, pg. 128). Corruption is still rampant and censorship may still be widespread. These weaknesses do not invalidate Freedom House ratings, but rather shows the need for other measures to be included in country and regional level analysis (see Transparency International, 2012)

MENA. Now that the press freedom in the MENA has been analyzed, revealing an unfree and highly censored environment, a more detailed discussion of the literature regarding the determinants of freedom of expression at the individual level, will be attempted.

Determinants of Freedom of Expression

Both the literature and current democratic developments in the MENA reveal support for democracy as a theory of governance. This begs the question: if MENA societies seek democratic governance characterized by a citizenry desirous of self-expressive values, then what influences these values?

Self-expression can be considered part of the “human development triad...consisting of three elements: action resources, self-expression values, and democratic institutions.”⁴⁸ Action resources are knowledge-based items like education and cognitive intellectual skills that encourage independent thinking.⁴⁹ Self-expressive societies value self-expression, egalitarianism, tolerance, interpersonal trust,⁵⁰ and freedom of speech.⁵¹ Self-expressive values are directly related to a society’s respect for free choice. These societies value the voice and agency of the individual. It is suggested that when societies move from survival-based low-income agrarian ways of life, to higher-income knowledge-based ones, democratic values and “freedoms” become more “imperative as people have the resources needed to practice them.”⁵²

⁴⁸ Welzel and Inglehart, (2008), 129.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “A True Clash of Civilizations,” *Foreign Policy* 135 (2003): 62-70.

⁵² Inglehart and Norris, 62-70.

Acknowledging that support for democracy is different than *actually* wanting a liberal democratic society is an important distinction. One could want democracy but fail to possess the knowledge and characteristics that foster it. This leads some to argue that self-expressive values are actually a more significant predictor for democratization, than mere support for democracy.⁵³ These values prioritize abstract concepts such as freedom, and some suggest a strong correlation between “self-expression values and effective democracy.”⁵⁴

Self-expressive values that precede the shift to a more democratic society ensure that the sense of autonomy which accompanies this shift encourages people to claim both their civil and political rights. Since freedom of speech is both a right and a tool by which individuals in society claim their rights, it is essential to understand how assorted variables affect people’s views, attitudes and relationship to freedom of speech. One set of variables which affects people’s attitudes towards freedom of speech is demographics. Research suggests that age plays an important factor in freedom of speech and willingness of the individual to censor, though the relationship remains contested.⁵⁵

Karen L. Bird (2000) finds older individuals to be more comfortable with censorship of hate speech, whereas younger individuals tend to be more open to the existence of extremist political groups.⁵⁶ Interestingly, Gloria Cowan (1992) does not find any relationship between age

⁵³ Welzel and Inglehart, (2008), 133. A finding confirmed in Inglehart’s, “How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy--And How Can we Measure It?,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 36, (2003) : 51-57. And, Welzel’s, “Are Levels of Democracy Affected by Mass Attitudes? Testing Attainment and Sustainment Effects on Democracy,” *International Political Science Review* 28, (2003): 397-424.

⁵⁴ Welzel and Inglehart, (2008), 132.

⁵⁵ Jennifer L. Lambe, "Who Wants to Censor Pornography and Hate Speech?," *Mass Communication & Society* 7, no. 3 (2004): 281.

⁵⁶ Karen L. Bird, “Racist Speech or Free Speech? A Comparison of the Law in France and the United States,” *Comparative Politics* 32, no. 4 (2000): 399-418.

and censorship.⁵⁷ Still others have found the relationship of age and censorship attitudes to be dependent on the content subject to censoring. Older participants viewed censorship in general, less positively, except for pornography.⁵⁸ Hernando Rojas, Dhavan V. Shah, and Ronald J. Faber (1996) report a positive connection between age and desire to censor.⁵⁹ While these findings are not entirely consistent with each other, one pattern does emerge: age influences attitudes towards specific types of speech. Age is an example of the importance in considering how one's role in society informs and shapes one's interaction with it.

In addition to age, numerous studies have shown differences across genders regarding free expression. In general, men possess a more open understanding and broader application of civil liberties.⁶⁰ Women tend to support censorship in relation to pornography and sexually explicit material more than men.⁶¹ Furthermore, women are more likely to perceive the harm of hate speech than men, whereas men are likely to view the importance of freedom of speech higher than women.⁶² Contrasting with the above consensus others have found, women are no more likely than men in generalized support for "expressive rights."⁶³

⁵⁷ Gloria Cowan, (1992), "Feminist Attitudes Toward Pornography Control," *Psychology of Women Quarterly* 16: 165-177.

⁵⁸ Lambe, 281. See Also, R. Hense and C. Wright, "The Development of the Attitudes Toward Censorship Questionnaire1," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 22, no. 21 (1992) : 1666-1675.

⁵⁹ Hernando Rojas and Dhavan V. Shah, and Ronald J. Faber, "For the Good of Others: Censorship and the Third-person Effect," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 8, no. 2 (1996): 163-186.

⁶⁰ Daniel M. Downs and Gloria Cowan, "Predicting the Importance of Freedom of Speech and the Perceived Harm of Hate Speech," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 42, no. 6 (2012): 1353-1375. See also, Marcus, G. E. (Ed.), "*With Malice Toward Some: How People Make Civil Liberties Judgments*," (Cambridge University Press, 1995): 59.

⁶¹ R. D. Fisher, Cook, I. J., & Shirkey, E. C., "Correlates of Support for Censorship of Sexual, Sexually Violent, and Violent Media," *Journal of Sex Research* 31, no. 3 (1994): 229-240.

⁶² Downs and Cowan, 1362.

⁶³ Lambe, 282. For data see, Andsanger and Miller.

The relationship between gender and support for freedom of speech weakens when one accounts for ideological orientations. Men's support for freedom of speech is less strong when powerful right-wing political orientations are held.⁶⁴ Previous studies found one's liberal-conservative self-ranking and one's personal liberalism to be significant factors affecting attitudes towards freedom of speech.⁶⁵ Liberals, in this context, are characterized as "intellectually independent," "broad-minded," and tolerant of different ideas and beliefs from their own.⁶⁶ On the one hand, liberalism is thought to be an important individual predictor in support of free speech: increased importance given to freedom of speech is directly related to higher levels of liberalism. On the contrary, greater conservatism is associated with increased opposition to free expression.⁶⁷ Individualism is closely linked to liberalism. Individualists value free speech and emphasize liberty, while opposing "external control and authority."⁶⁸ Individualism is also characterized by a self-reliance emphasizing personal freedom.⁶⁹ Individualism, like liberalism is an important predictor of high levels of support for freedom of speech.⁷⁰

⁶⁴ Bloom and Arikan, 262.

⁶⁵ Lambe, 283, 284. And, Downs and Cowan, 1356

⁶⁶ Downs and Cowan, 1356.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 1367. And, Lambe, 293. It is important to note that some have argued against the biases of the researchers (Lambe, (2004), 283, 284). They argue that "studies suggesting conservatives are more likely to be in favor of censorship are themselves ideological biased" because they include content that conservatives would want to censor, like pornography. Naturally not acknowledging biases limits results, and the important takeaway, is that conflicting ideas concerning political self-identification is that when interpreting one, *must* not assume their biases do not influence their interpretation of the information.

⁶⁸ Harry C. Hui and Harry C. Triandis, "Individualism-Collectivism A Study of Cross-Cultural Researchers," *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 17, no. 2 (1986): 225-248, Quoted in Downs and Cowan, 1356.

⁶⁹ Irwin Katz and R. Glen Hass, "Racial Ambivalence and American Value Conflict: Correlational and Priming Studies of Dual Cognitive Structures," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 55, no. 6 (1998): 894.

⁷⁰ Downs and Cowan, 1367.

Education and intellect are also important factors which influence individual attitudes towards free speech. More often than not, educated individuals are less likely to censor expression,⁷¹ but there are some who suggest otherwise.⁷² Again, like gender and age there can be conflicting conclusions as researchers' personal interpretations and biases influence available data. While there are clearly disagreements in the previously mentioned variables, in general, intellect at the individual level seems to correlate positively with attitudes towards freedom of expression.

Intellect is an "individual attribute that *should* be related to understanding and acknowledging the importance of free speech."⁷³ A person who possesses intellect can be described as insightful, introspective, imaginative, and having an array of interests.⁷⁴ In order to completely grasp the abstract concept of free speech, "one must be able to distinguish between the costs of speech in the immediate state, and the broader, more long-term implications" of the freedom.⁷⁵ An individual with high intellect is more likely to grapple with issues concerning the harm to the target of speech and "long-term social harm" of speech regulation.⁷⁶ These individuals seek a deeper understanding of complex issues, seeing the costs of suppression of unwanted and unpopular forms of speech as potentially causing harm to democratic societies.

⁷¹ Lambe, 283.

⁷² Andsanger and Miller, 102-114. And, Peter Suedfeld and G. Daniel Steele, "Political Ideology and Attitudes Toward Censorship," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 24, (1994): 765-781.

⁷³ Downs and Cowan, 1355.

⁷⁴ Downs and Cowan, 1355. And, Robert R. McCrae, and Oliver P. John, "An Introduction to the Five-factor Model and its Applications," *Journal of Personality* 60, no. 2 (1992): 197.

⁷⁵ Downs and Cowan, 1355.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

As mentioned already, research strongly suggests that MENA citizens are not opposed to democracy, and a number of studies have shown that a majority are in fact supportive of democracy as a system of government.⁷⁷ Weaknesses of some arguments on the region decontextualize people's responses when comparing them to other more "traditional" "democratic" nations. How different religious groups interact with their society, both public and private, is very different from country to country, even within in a given geographic region, let alone a broader international one. However, regional research regarding religion, democracy and democratic values consistently shows, no matter the context, that religion does not equate to antidemocratic values.

Throughout the MENA, especially given the recent political upheaval, views concerning democratic development and values will undoubtedly continue to change. The existence of democratic values in the MENA is not new, but current popular support of these values do appear to have increased in their public display, as witnessed by the continued protesting in the region. As part of this democratic evolution in the region, relationships with core human rights (especially freedom of speech), will continue to change.

As the MENA grapples with uncertain transitions, what role will Islamic practice play for Muslims in how they interact with these changes? While Islam does not affect democracy as a theory of government, how might individual interpretations of Islam influence attitudes towards democracy in practice? A democracy with its self-expressive rights is no longer such a distant concept. No doubt it will have some influence, but will Islam as a religious worldview and practice be *the* dominant factor in shaping and influencing conceptions of freedom of expression in

⁷⁷ See, Tessler (2002), Jamal and Tessler (2008) and Tessler (2010).

the MENA? If so, does the religious practice in the lives of Muslims only suppress and restrict people's expression of ideas? The intent of my work will be to determine the affect that religiosity has on free speech. This work argues that the practice of Islam is not the only, or even most important, factor in individual attitudes towards free expression in the region. Rather, it is strongly-held individual authoritarian traits and important demographic factors, such as education and gender, which truly influence attitudes.

To examine these relationships, I undertake a comparison of two countries, Morocco and Lebanon. I will use survey data in each country, collected by the Arab Barometer Project, to assess individual attitudes towards freedom of speech, and specifically the role of religiosity in how it affects tolerance and support for freedom of expression.

IV. Freedom of Expression in Lebanon and Morocco

As democratic development is rapidly underway in the MENA, knowledge of how the citizens in the region relate to a broad set of democratic rights is required. While there are numerous potential relationships to analyze, this essay will focus on relationships between individual religiosity and freedom of speech, in addition to, authoritarianism and freedom of speech. Also included will be relevant demographics which have been shown to influence individual attitudes towards democratic rights and freedom of speech.⁷⁸ Analyzing all available data would be ideal but beyond the scope of this work. The examination of Morocco and Lebanon will provide some unique and relevant insights concerning individual attitudes towards freedom of speech.

⁷⁸ Lambe, 281 and 282. See, Hense and & C. Wright. Rojas, and Shah, and Faber: 163-186. And, Downs and Cowan, 1353-1375. See also, Marcus, G. E. (Ed.), *“With Malice Toward Some: How People Make Civil Liberties Judgments,”* (Cambridge University Press, 1995): 59. Downs and Cowan, 1362.

The survey data collected for Morocco were in-person interviews conducted in Arabic during the Fall of 2006, that included 1277 respondents over the age of eighteen which was approximately 50% female and 50% male. Interviewees were chosen from 100 zones (60 urban and 40 rural), that took “quotas for type of living situation, gender, age, whether married or not, socio-economic level and level of education.”⁷⁹ The survey data collected for Lebanon were in-person interviews conducted in Arabic during the Fall of 2007, that included 1195 respondents, over the age of eighteen which was approximately 50% female and 50% male. The sample was “nationally representative” “drawn from a master sampling frame” based on a complete variety of localities which included small and medium villages, and small and large towns and cities.”⁸⁰ Before moving forward, it must be noted that samples are only considered representative of the countries where the surveys were conducted, and any conclusion beyond the borders of these two nations will be and should be done so with hesitancy as this work acknowledges the distinct differences between the citizens of these countries and their neighbors. Now, I turn to a brief case selection analysis.

Case Selection: Why Morocco and Lebanon?

In a study of attitudes towards freedom of expression, nations such as Morocco, where large portions of the citizenry feel uncomfortable criticizing their own government, warrant research. Far too much reliance solely on economic factors has created the view of Morocco being a “liberal” state.⁸¹ Some insist Morocco is exceptional having found a “third path,” somewhere

⁷⁹ “Field Reports for Arab Barometer Survey,” Available online at: www.arabbarometer.org.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Third Edition, 2008), 311-316.

between the traditional authoritarian monarchy and a liberal democracy.⁸² Morocco has certainly liberalized their economy. Considering the suggested wealth of the Monarchy, economic liberalization appears to have done more to enrich national leaders than develop the country economically.⁸³ Moreover, liberalization has largely ended with economic matters, and political liberalization continues to falter. As such, it is unclear whether or not a third-path has been found.⁸⁴ Nevertheless, the monarchy since independence from France in 1954, has seen it beneficial to encourage multiple political groups.⁸⁵ Morocco's unique place in the Arab world as a "modern" "liberal" monarchy lends itself to analysis that considers relationships between personal attitudes and democratic values, such as freedom of expression. Political pluralism does not characterize Moroccan governance or much of the MENA for that matter. However, in a region where authoritarians have strived to eliminate political pluralism, the Lebanese system remains pluralistic.

Lebanon is a country with a long standing history of political pluralism, but it also has a history of political instability characterized by assassinations and war. Lebanese political leadership is allocated according to religious sects. Political power and positions are divided among the various religious sects, including Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims and Druze.⁸⁶

⁸² James Traub, "The Reform of the King," *Foreign Policy* 11, no. 196 (2012): 42-48. And, Ahmed Benchemsi, "Morocco and Press Freedom: A Complicated Relationship," *Nieman Reports* Fall 2011: 46-48. And, Benchemsi, "Morocco: Outfoxing the Opposition," *Journal of Democracy* 23, no. 1 (2012): 57-68.

⁸³ Tatiana Serafin, "The World's Richest Royal," *Forbes* 17 June 2009, Available online at: www.forbes.com.

⁸⁴ World Bank, "Morocco: Country Data," Available online at: <http://data.worldbank.org/country/morocco>, Accessed 12 Feb 2014. And, Benchemsi, (2012), 57-68. And, Serafin, "The World's Richest Royal".

⁸⁵ Ellen Lust-Okar, Ellen and Amaney Ahmad Jamal, "Rulers and Rules: Reassessing the Influence of Regime Type on Electoral Law Formation," *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (2002): 337-366. See also Charrad, Mounira M, *States and Women's Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

⁸⁶ Eugene Rogan, *The Arabs: A History*, (New York: Basic Books, 2011), 216, 217.

The National Pact of 1943 was an unwritten agreement that further solidified the division. The pact stipulated that the president would be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament a Shiite Muslim. Druze and other religious communities are allotted a number of other cabinet posts.⁸⁷ Despite the instability, elections are held regularly, the press is free, public debate remains strong and healthy, and Lebanon has remained a “political refuge and free enterprise for the rest of the region.”⁸⁸ In addition, Lebanon has an influential parliament.

This is a stark contrast to Morocco. Morocco is ruled by an authoritarian government, has a weak parliament, the press is censored and dissidence is suppressed, and Morocco remains economically stagnant.⁸⁹ The divergent systems of Morocco and Lebanon suggest very different relationships with freedom of expression. One would expect that the individuals in both countries would also hold very different attitudes toward freedom of expression. Consequently, this contrast should produce some compelling results concerning the subject.

It is well established that individuals in different countries, including those of the MENA, even if they are of the same ethnicity, cultural backgrounds, religion etc., hold views and possess attitudes different from one another. As noted by Tessler (2002 and 2010) Jamal and Tessler (2008), it has also been established that being devoutly Muslim is not a convincing predictor of anti-democratic attitudes, or of pro-democratic attitudes. However, if individuals are viewed within their country context, different trends may emerge in religious or non-religious citizens

⁸⁷ Ibid., 241-242.

⁸⁸ Richards and Waterbury, 317.

⁸⁹ World Bank, “GDP per Capita,” *World Bank Data* (2012), Available online at: www.worldbank.org

and authoritarian or non-authoritarians, in Morocco and Lebanon as they relate to freedom of expression.⁹⁰ Because Morocco and Lebanon have different systems of government, centers of power, economic successes and failures, and relationships to freedom of expression, they remain important sites for analysis.

V. Data: The Arab Barometer Survey, Wave I

In an attempt to better understand the determinants of attitudes and support for freedom of expression in the MENA, I will use the Arab Barometer Survey conducted between 2006 and 2008 in Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, Palestine (West Bank and Gaza), Jordan, Lebanon and Yemen.⁹¹ Arab Barometer data will provide a window into individual attitudes and values prior to the Arab Spring. The survey's focus on attitudes and beliefs related to pluralism, freedoms, democratic understandings and religiosity, is particularly well suited to answering questions concerning the relationship between religiosity and freedom of speech.

There are issues concerning the use of survey data due to the inherently subjective nature of survey questions and responses. Some of those points of contention relate to cognitive issues, social desirability and attitudinal existence.⁹² Cognitive issues relate to framing of questions and differences in responses that illicit minor changes. Social desirability refers to variances in re-

⁹⁰ Pascal Menoret, "Leaving Islamic Activism Behind: Ambiguous Disengagement in Saudi Arabia," in *Social movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa*, Edited by Joel Beinin, and Frédéric Vairel, (Stanford University Press, 2011).

⁹¹ The Arab Barometer addresses a wide range of "attitudes, values and behavior patterns relating to pluralism, freedoms, tolerance and equal opportunity; social and inter-personal trust; social, religious and political identities; conceptions of governance and an understanding of democracy; and civic engagement and political participation." Arab Barometer I, *Arab Barometer*, www.arabbarometer.org.

⁹² Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan, "Do People Mean What They Say? Implications for Subjective Survey Data," *The American Economic Review* 91, no. 2 (2001): 67-72.

sponses by people, who answer questions in the ways they believe they *should* answer, but they are not necessarily a reflection of the attitudes they truly hold. Attitudinal existence represents attitudes possessed by respondents that do not exist coherently, because respondents answer questions concerning their attitudes only because the question is asked, leading *some* to believe the question to be important. If the question is important, then one must have a response. Those holding skeptical views of survey data argue that people frame their responses in this constructed and unnatural context leading to less valid and reliable results. In this case, the respondent may not have a proper grasp of the subject or their view, consequently their views change, sometimes dramatically. Despite its drawbacks, economists like Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan (2001), support the use of surveys because these subjective measures are useful as long as the results are interpreted with care.⁹³ Survey data possesses a wealth of information, something even skeptics reluctantly acknowledge, which can be a useful tool to understand individual level attitudes.

Variable Description and Summary Statistics

This section introduces all the relevant variables that will be considered for analysis. While not exhaustive, the indicators chosen help shed light on individuals' concepts and ideas related to democracy and civil rights. The main indicators include freedom of speech, religiosity, authoritarianism and some demographics factors. Respondents who declined to answer or responded "don't know" are excluded from the results.⁹⁴

⁹³ Bertrand and Mullainathan, 70-72.

⁹⁴ The percentage of respondents declining to answer or responding "don't know" represent a very small percentage (often less than 1%) of all respondents.

Freedom of Speech

As the main focus of this work, I use two questions to capture individual attitudes toward freedom of speech and expression, and one question to grasp individual views of their country-level freedom of speech context. The first question captures views on disagreement among political groups, revealing potential comfort levels with positions they may not agree with. The second question asks people to give their opinion of their personal comfort in criticizing their own government. The final question reveals the importance that the individual places on leader's openness and comfort with both political ideas they agree with, and ones they do not. The following are the indicators and possible responses relevant to freedom of speech chosen for this work:

1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

a) Competition and disagreement among political groups is not a bad thing for our country

2. Now I am going to read to you a list of statements that describe how people often feel about the state affairs in [country name]. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with each of these statement.

b) People are free to criticize government without fear.

3. People sometimes talk about factors that make a person qualified for national leadership. On this card are listed some of the qualifications to which different people would give priority. Please state which one these you, yourself, consider the most important.

b) Openness to diverse political ideas.

In Morocco and Lebanon, nearly two-thirds of survey respondents agree that competition, disagreement and debate are preferable. In Morocco, of all respondents, only 36% believe they are free to criticize their government, and 57% believe they are not free to criticize their government. Moroccan respondents also overwhelming (87%) believe that openness to diverse political ideas is an important factor that qualifies a leader for political office. In Lebanon, 87% of respondents claim they are free to criticize their government and 97% believe a leader with openness to diverse political ideas is someone they considered to be qualified.

Both countries' respondents affirm their support of the democratic system as way of governing and supporting civil rights. In Morocco, 90% of respondents support democracy and in Lebanon, support was at 92%. Support for democracy in theory does not necessarily lead to support for it in practice. For example, in Lebanon, only 15% believe it is ever justifiable to violate human rights for national security or stability of the nation. Whereas in Morocco, 40% believe it is completely justifiable to violate human rights to promote security and stability.

Generally, both country respondents are supportive of democracy and freedom of speech, in theory. In addition, both countries' respondents are quite supportive of diverse points of view from their leaders. In fact, citizens believe it is a requirement for political office. However interestingly, in the case of Morocco, respondents were less supportive of rights like freedom of

speech. This was evidenced by their willingness to suppress rights in the name of security and stability. The same cannot be said for Lebanon, as they were not supportive of the idea of suppression of rights for the sake of security and stability.

Religiosity

To understand the role that individual level religiosity plays in explaining attitudes toward freedom, I use the following indicators:

1. Do you Pray?
a) Yes b) No

2. Do you pray at:
a) Mosque b) Home c)Both d) Church

3. How often do you read the Quran?
a) Everyday or Almost Everyday b) Several Times a Week c) Sometimes d) Rarely e) I don't Read

There may be several religious traditions practiced in both countries, but the variations between different religious practices will not be analyzed, as data for Morocco regarding religious traditions other than Islam, are unavailable. The questions pertaining specifically to individual religiosity are sufficient to obtain a grasp of the religiosity of Moroccan and Lebanese respondents. Both countries exhibit similarly levels of religiosity.

On questions relating to prayer, 82% of respondents in Morocco claimed they prayed and 86% of respondents in Lebanon claimed the same. When asked where prayer takes place, only 4% of respondents in Morocco prayed solely at the mosque, nearly 45% claimed they prayed at home and another 51% prayed at both. Like respondents in Morocco, the Lebanese stated that 3% of them prayed at the mosque, 38% prayed at home and nearly 50% prayed at both.

These religious figures show little difference in individual habits with regard to prayer, but differences in levels of reading of the Qur'an were noticeable. For Lebanese respondents, just over 82% read the Qur'an at least on a rare occasion, and 32% read it at least several times a week. In contrast, only 59% of Moroccans surveyed read it at least rarely, and only 23% read it at least several times a week. For Morocco and Lebanon, these numbers are likely representative of both countries' literacy levels. The most recent CIA World Factbook claims the Lebanese literacy rate to be almost 90%, whereas the Moroccan literacy rate was at a much lower 67%. The numbers of those who read the Qur'an is naturally influenced by the ability to read a text. Consequently, this data correlates between percentages of those who read the Qur'an and those who do not.

Authoritarianism

Authoritarian traits possessed by an individual are usually an influential factor and predictor of negative relationships to democracy and democratic attitudes.⁹⁵ Authoritarian individuals tend to value conservation of perceived or real historic values and more importantly, an unusually strong deference to authority, in contrast to non-authoritarian individuals.⁹⁶ To assess

⁹⁵ Canetti-Nisim (2004), 377, 378, 382, 383.

⁹⁶ Canetti-Nisim, 388. Lambe, 283, 284. And, Downs and Cowan, 1356.

individual authoritarian levels and its relationship to freedom of speech the following indicators were used:

1. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “People should always support the decisions of their government even if they disagree with these decisions”:	
a) Strongly agree.	b) Agree.
c) Disagree.	d) Strongly disagree.
e) Can't choose.	f) Decline to Answer.

2. I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing [country name]. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing [country name]?
a) Democratic political system (public freedom, equal political and civil rights, balance of power, accountability and transparency).
b) A strong non-democratic leader that does not bother with parliament and elections
c) Having experts rather than government make decisions according to what is best for the country
d) A system that is a mixture of the above three under one ruler

Agreement with the first question suggests that a citizen possesses authoritarian traits. A potential counterargument is that support for one's government, when they disagree with its actions or policies, does not always equate to authoritarian beliefs. It may be an admission that political peace and stability are more important than freedom of expression. One could imagine an individual holding this position and placing survival level values over higher order ones, but he or she would still be considered to hold authoritarian views. Relying on one question to determine a set of typical traits concerning authoritarianism reveals a limitation. Unfortunately, creating an index based on other survey research is beyond the scope of this work.

Nearly 60% of Moroccans either agree or strongly agree that one should support their government even when wrong. In contrast, only 27% of Lebanese respondents agreed with this statement. Ninety-four percent of Lebanese respondents perceived a singular “non-democratic” leader who does not bother with democratic processes, as bad or very bad. Whereas 73% of Moroccans felt that a “non-democratic” leader that does not bother with democratic process was bad or very bad.

While a significant percentage of Moroccans claim that authoritarianism is a bad or very bad system of government, a significant percentage also feels it is important to support leadership, even when leadership is wrong. This apparent inconsistency is difficult to explain, and may be related to the unique political system of the nation. Authoritarian and non-authoritarian responses in both countries, reveals citizenries with a very different relationship to their government, society, and history. Authoritarian levels will produce very different responses in attitudes towards freedom of speech.

Demographic Variables

In addition to the religious and authoritarian makeup of the survey respondents discussed in the previous sections, I will also examine the relationship between key demographic variables. These are important determinants of attitudes towards democracy and freedom of speech.⁹⁷ Such variables include gender, education, and age, all of which have been highlighted as important determinants of attitudes towards democracy. The rights associated with them are freedom of

⁹⁷ Lambe, 281 and 282. See, Hense and & C. Wright. Rojas, and Shah, and Faber: 163-186. And, Downs and Cowan, 1353-1375. See also, Marcus, G. E. (Ed.), “*With Malice Toward Some: How People Make Civil Liberties Judgments*,” (Cambridge University Press, 1995): 59. Downs and Cowan, 1362.

religion, freedom of conscience, freedom of movement and freedom of speech.⁹⁸ As stated previously, all participants were over the age of 18 and the gender distribution for both Morocco and Lebanon was approximately 50% female and 50% male.

The Arab Barometer separates their respondents' level of education into seven different categories: illiterate, elementary, primary, secondary, college diploma or two years of college (associate's degree), bachelor's degree and master's or higher. The country breakdown is as follows. In Morocco, nearly 40% of respondents claimed they were illiterate, 25% had completed elementary, 17% had completed primary school, 9% had completed secondary school and less than 11% had completed more than two years of college.

In contrast, only 2% of Lebanese respondents were illiterate, 8% had completed elementary school, 24% had completed primary school, 24% had completed secondary school, and by comparison to Morocco, a staggering 42% of Lebanese respondents had a two or four year degree, and or master's or higher level of college education. One would expect the higher education levels in Lebanon to strongly predict far more openness to ideas concerning freedom of expression, as noted in previous sections of this work.

Affirmed by Tesser (2002), Lambe (2004), Downs and Cowan (2012), these demographic factors are expected to play an important role in determining attitudes of Moroccan and Lebanese respondents. However, following Tessler's (2002) work on both countries, this work expects gender to play the most significant role with regards to the demographic variables considered. In the next section we will begin our bivariate analysis.

⁹⁸ Bird, 399-418. And, Lambe, 281, 283, Hense and Wright, (1992), 1666-1675, Rojas, Shah, Faber, 163-186, Downs and Cowan, 1353-1375, Fisher, Cook, and Shirkey, (1994), 229-240.

VI. Explaining Attitudes toward Freedom of Expression in Morocco and Lebanon

In this section an analysis of the relationships and associations laid out in this work will be undertaken. The comparisons made attempt to reveal which factors are most important in explaining attitudes toward freedom of speech. While, as noted previously, there are a number of factors that could be included in this analysis, this work will focus on bivariate variables. The main relationships of interest are those between religiosity and freedom of speech, authoritarianism and freedom of speech, and specific demographics and freedom of speech, with religiosity, authoritarianism and demographics as the independent variables. In focusing on freedom of speech specifically, rather than the broader topic of support for democracy overall, this research will add a layer to an already established model of viewing democracy and democratic civil rights in the MENA. In other words, most of the literature on religion in the region focuses only on the broader relationship between Islam in practice at the individual level and democracy. Through a specific analysis of freedom of speech as it relates to democracy, this work will present a nuanced view on the MENA.

Religiosity

The main variable considered as it relates to freedom of speech, is the individual religiosity of a respondent, simply determined by whether the individual prays or not. Table 1 shows the relationship between this indicator of religiosity and freedom to criticize the government. In Morocco, of the religious (those who pray), 40% agree they are free to criticize the government, which leaves nearly 60% feeling they are not free to do so. Comparing that with those who do not pray, 28% claim they are free, and 71% state they are not free to criticize their government.

These results suggest a relationship between religiosity and increased comfort in expressing opinion in Morocco.

When the same relationship is considered in Lebanon, there is no significant statistical relationship between religiosity and freedom to criticize the government, at least when measured by whether an individual prays or not (See Table 2). Nearly 90% of all respondents feel free to criticize their government. Based upon the perception of Lebanon being a liberal media environment, as confirmed by Freedom House ratings, the results of the Arab Barometer where it concerns free speech, support commonly held assumptions that Lebanese society is characterized by “vigorous” debate.⁹⁹

Moroccan respondents, shown by Table 3, both the religious and those who are not, believe openness to diverse opinions, is an important trait for an elected official to possess. Most Moroccan respondents strongly agree or agree (91%) that political leaders’ openness to diverse opinions is an important or very important qualification. Interestingly, the religious are more likely to believe it to be a very important quality, much more so than the unreligious. Sixty-three percent of Moroccan respondents who prayed thought it a very important quality. Forty-nine percent of those who do not pray felt that it is very important. In Morocco, being religious increases the chances one will be supportive of a leader who is open to diverse opinions. In Lebanon, shown in Table 4, both the religious and the non-religious almost exclusively believe openness to diverse opinions to be an important or very important quality in a political leader, and as such, there is no relationship between religiosity and attitudes towards freedom of speech.

⁹⁹ McCracken, 162. Richards and Waterbury, 317.

While both countries' respondents had opposite views on whether they were supportive of rights suppression in the name of national security, for Moroccans, more so than the Lebanese, support or rejection of rights suppression was not predicated on the religiosity of the individual (Table 5 and 6). Those who are religious are no more or less likely to support suppression of rights. These results appear to contradict with widely held views and generalizations about religious individuals regarding their willingness to submit to authority.¹⁰⁰

Suppression and anti-freedom of speech values are not exclusively a belief or behavior of the religious, and the tendency to equate lack of openness to diversity in ideas, thoughts and people, as a trait of the religious, does not follow from the data analyzed here. Since one's religiosity does not necessarily predict negative relationships to freedom of speech or freedom of expression, then it appears that other more influential factors may play a bigger role than one's religiosity.¹⁰¹ As the work of Tessler (2002), Canetti-Nisim (2004), Amaney Jamal and Tessler (2008) did not find strong evidence of a relationship between religiosity with democracy and democratic values, neither does this work suggest a strong relationship between religiosity and freedom of speech.

Authoritarianism

As Canetti-Nisim (2004) and Downs and Cowan (2012) showed, authoritarianism at the individual level predicts a negative relationships to freedom of speech. Consequently, authoritarianism at the individual level in the MENA should also predicate negative attitude towards free-

¹⁰⁰ Canetti-Nisim (2004), 377, 378, 382, 383, 388. And, Lambe, 283, 284, Downs and Cowan, 1356.

¹⁰¹ Canetti-Nisim (2004), 377, 378, 382, 383, 388.

dom of speech. Which is why authoritarianism plays a central role in the analysis on both Morocco and Lebanon.

For Morocco, as seen in Table 7, most people support political disagreement. Overall, Moroccans are supportive of competition among political groups. This is especially true, when we look at the relationship between authoritarianism and support for political diversity and competition. Interestingly, we see that authoritarians are more supportive of political competition. This appears to contradict popular held understandings of authoritarians.¹⁰² For the non-authoritarians in Morocco, it is more likely for them to fear disagreement and competition in society because their views, by their nature, are less likely to coincide with the views held by those in power. This is discussed in more detail in Section VII.

Table 8 shows that Lebanese respondents were not nearly as supportive as Moroccan respondents when it comes to diverse political opinions. Forty-five percent of those who are strongly authoritarian strongly agree, that diversity in competition and disagreement among political groups is a good thing. Whereas only 34% of those who are strongly non-authoritarian feel the same. Again, like in Morocco, authoritarians might naturally be more supportive of competition and disagreement in Lebanon, because their views are supportive of the status quo. The same cannot be said for non-authoritarians in Lebanon. These Lebanese non-authoritarians have experienced competition and disagreement, but because Lebanon remains plagued by internal strife and instability, non-authoritarians do not support their system.¹⁰³

¹⁰² Canetti-Nisim (2004), 377, 378, 382, 383, 388. And, Lambe, 283, 284, Downs and Cowan, 1356.

¹⁰³ Samir Makdisi and Marcus Marktanner, "Trapped by Consociationalism: The case of Lebanon," (2009).

While both countries were supportive of competition and disagreement, there were mixed results in the how comfortable respondents were in criticizing the government. Moroccans, both authoritarian and non-authoritarian, were far less likely to feel comfortable criticizing government than the Lebanese authoritarians and non-authoritarians. But interestingly for Moroccans, as seen in Table 9, those who are the least authoritarian as a percentage of their category are far less comfortable criticizing their government. Forty percent of all strongly non-authoritarian individuals strongly disagree that they are able to criticize their government. Given the current political context in Morocco this comes as no surprise. Considering the popularity and power of King Muhammad VI, an authoritarian leader by any account, authoritarians would be supportive of him, and therefore have little fear of criticizing him, because their views would most likely be in agreement with his. Non-authoritarians are less supportive of authoritarian ideals, and less supportive of him, so they would be far more fearful of criticizing him.

In contrast, we can see from Table 10 that 87% of Lebanese respondents either strongly agree or agree that they are free to criticize their government. Even more so than in Morocco, 70% of strongly authoritarian Lebanese people feel that they are free to criticize their government, but only 54% of the non-authoritarians agree that they are free to criticize. These numbers may reveal a context in which they have experienced democracy and have found it lacking, and consequently, values associated with it are viewed less positively.

Figure 1 presents the relationship between authoritarianism and support for restricting human rights in the name of national security. In line with Canetti-Nisim (2004) and Downs and Cowan (2012) findings on authoritarians, in both Lebanon and Morocco, authoritarians felt it more justifiable to restrict human rights in the name of national security and stability than re-

spondents who hold non-authoritarian values. In Morocco, 79% of those strongly authoritarian respondents believed the government should restrict rights in the name of stability and security, whereas only 52% of those strongly non-authoritarian were supportive. Nevertheless, in both countries, the relationship between authoritarianism and support for rights suppression are statistically significant. Those who are more authoritarian in both Morocco and Lebanon, predictably feel it is justified to restrict human rights in the name of stability and security.

The tendency repeats itself at every level from authoritarian to non-authoritarian. As Moroccan respondents were less authoritarian, they became less supportive of rights suppression. Over one-third of strongly non-authoritarians felt it not justifiable in any circumstances, in contrast to the 12% of the strongly authoritarian respondents feeling the same way. Lebanon reveals a similar pattern. While 67% of Lebanese who were strongly authoritarian believed that rights suppression was never justified, that still falls well short of the 85% of those who were strongly non-authoritarian, believing rights suppression was never justified.

Another important finding was between authoritarianism and views concerning the qualifications of political leaders (See Table 11 and 12). Respondents from both countries believed an important qualification of political office holders was openness to diverse political opinion. In Lebanon, 97% of all respondents believed diversity of opinion was an important or very important value. The only respondents in either country who were at or below 93% support were those who were strongly non-authoritarian in Morocco. Nearly one-fifth of Moroccan respondents did not feel openness to diverse political opinions important, but again an overwhelming majority did.

In conclusion, the data analyzed with reference to authoritarian traits at the individual levels, reveals some compelling relationships. First, while Moroccans are generally more supportive of authoritarian leaders, Moroccan respondents were just as likely to support openness to debate and were quite supportive of free speech. They were more supportive of free speech even when they felt they are less at liberty to use said freedom than their Lebanese counterparts. Lebanese respondents while supportive of freedom of speech, those who do not possess authoritarian views have less positive attitudes towards diversity of opinion and disagreement in politics. Now that both religiosity and authoritarian traits have been analyzed as independent variables, the final site for analysis will be demographic make-up of the survey respondents.

Demographics

Numerous demographic factors influence attitudes towards freedom of expression, and the Arab Barometer provides ample amounts of data. However, the ones included in this work are, gender, age and education. All three are variables shown in previous research to play an influential role in relationship to the subject of democratic rights rights associated with democracy.¹⁰⁴

In Morocco, the differences between genders were not drastically different with regard to competition and disagreement between political groups. As seen in Table 13, 47% of male respondents strongly agreed with the competition and disagreement indicators and 39% of females strongly agreed. While the nearly 8% difference is important, it is made up however, in the difference with those who “somewhat agree.” Thirty-eight percent of women and only 31% of men claimed they somewhat agreed with competition and disagreement among political groups.

¹⁰⁴ Lambe, 281 and 282. See also, Hense and Wright, 1666-1675. Rojas, Shah, and Faber, 163-186. Downs and Cowan, 1353-1375. See also, Marcus, 59.

Following the trend of general support for democracy in Lebanon, both men and women were quite supportive of democracy as system which possesses freedom and civil rights (See Table 14). While men were about 6% more supportive in the “very good” response category, overall, 95% of both women and men stated democracy was good or very good. Men were the most supportive of democracy, and both genders were overwhelmingly supportive of democracy in general. Consequently, there was no relationship between gender and support for democracy in Lebanon. In Morocco, support for democracy as a way of governing was viewed more positively by men, however, it appears that the difference is only somewhat more likely in supporting the system when the response was “very good” (See Table 15).

In Lebanon, no matter one’s age, repression of rights for stability and security purposes was viewed as never justifiable. While there was very little difference between those of various age groups of statistical significance, responses to competition and disagreement among political groups varied among gender. On both extremes (see Table 16), those strongly supportive and those strongly against, women were shown to be less supportive of competition and disagreement between political groups, a confirmation of research by Tessler (2002) and Downs in Cowan (2012). Women were approximately 11% less supportive of disagreement, when the response was “strongly agree”, and almost 7% more in strong disagreement where competition and disagreement between political groups was concerned.

Another telling result found in Lebanon, was the relationship that education level had on attitudes towards disagreement and competition among political groups (See Table 17). As the education level of the respondent increased, support for democracy as a system, increased. While all Lebanese were supportive of democracy, only 64% of illiterate respondents thought

democracy was “very good” in comparison to the overwhelming 81% of the most educated who felt the same way. When looking at specific components, like freedom of speech for example, clear and strong trends emerge.

As respondent education increased, support for competition and disagreement among political groups did also. For example, only 17% of the illiterate strongly agree that the competition and disagreement among political groups was a good thing whereas nearly 40% of those with a master’s degree or higher stated the same. The trend line steadily increases as one becomes more educated, which confirms others work on the subject of intellect and education.¹⁰⁵ As people become more educated they were likely to view diversity in politics as a good thing for their country.

Contrary to Lebanese results, education did not play a factor in determining individual Moroccan respondents’ attitude towards democracy and rights associated with it (see Table 18).¹⁰⁶ At every level of education from those who claimed illiteracy to those with a Master’s degree or higher, support for democracy and the rights associated with it such as freedom of expression, was very high. The expectation that education level would predict higher support for democracy in both Lebanon and Morocco; and therefore higher support for freedom of speech, was not supported by the data analyzed for this work.¹⁰⁷

After reviewing and analyzing relationships between demographics and democratic rights, while limited, there were some compelling differences and similarities between the two

¹⁰⁵ Downs and Cowan, 1355. And, McCrae, and John, 197.

¹⁰⁶ Lambe, 283. And, Downs and Cowan, 1355. And, McCrae, and John, 197.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

countries. While demography helps predict some relationships, in general, respondents from both nations are quite supportive of democracy, yet when asked in specifics, those with more education tended to be more supportive, especially in Lebanon. In addition, gender did seem to play a role, specifically in Lebanon. While nothing groundbreaking, it is a confirmation that multiple factors influence individual level views of freedom of speech.

VII. Discussion

In this section I will explore several of the key relationships analyzed in the previous section, and the potential causes for a number of relationships analyzed. My hope is that in contextualizing these relationships, we can obtain a better understanding of the results presented above. This work sought to determine what role religion plays in relation to freedom of speech. The data revealed important conclusions, adding value to the conversation and research on the MENA, democracy, civil rights and the Arab Spring. This section will discuss several key findings in the understanding of what affects individual attitudes towards freedom of expression.

Morocco

According to the descriptive data, Morocco is a highly religious nation, almost exclusively Islamic. The King, even in the constitution, has remained a sacred and inviolable individual, an arbiter above politics, and a direct representative of God.¹⁰⁸ All of this is symbolically represented in an annual ceremony during which subjects pledge their allegiance to him.¹⁰⁹ Findings in this work suggest that being religious does not negatively affect attitudes towards freedom of

¹⁰⁸ Benchemsi, (2012), 59.

¹⁰⁹ Ali Ibrahim, "Morocco: Bowing to the King," *Al-Akhbar English*, August 30, 2012, <http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/11611>.

speech as modernization literature posits.¹¹⁰ Another important relationship was found between authoritarianism and freedom to criticize the government. Individuals with authoritarian values were more likely to feel comfortable criticizing the Moroccan government. While this may seem counter intuitive, situating the results in the broader context of Moroccan politics can help shed light on why those respondents who are most religious and hold authoritarian attitudes are more likely to feel free to criticize the government.

It may be that religious individuals relate to the state differently. In Morocco, depending on their willingness to acknowledge the regime's accepted interpretation of religions, those who claim to be religious are likely to be more comfortable in society.¹¹¹ In contrast, the less religious or the unreligious are less free, because their criticism may take a different form, as they do not relate to the King in the same way a religious individual might. Religiosity predicts comfort with expression concerning government, potentially only when individual practice of religion is in agreement with the government's interpretation.

Support for leaders open to ideological diversity is important to the religious and the non-religious in Moroccan society, where 91% of all Moroccans think openness to diverse political ideas is important or very important. There is a 13% difference between the religious and non-religious when it comes to respondents who believe openness to diverse political opinion is "very important." In this case, the religious are significantly more likely by number and percentage than their less religious counterparts, to believe this to be important. This is compelling for two

¹¹⁰ Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

¹¹¹ Kassem Bahaji, "Moroccan Islamists: Between Integration, Confrontation, and Ordinary Muslims," *MERIA Journal* 15, no. 1 (2011): 1-16. And, Mohammed, Errihani, "Managing Religious Discourse in the Mosque: The End of Extremist Rhetoric During the Friday Sermon," *The Journal of North African Studies* 16, no. 3 (2011): 381-394.

reasons. The first is that while the Moroccan government is comfortable with censorship, it is not necessarily representing the will of the people. According to the survey, Moroccans are far more open to diverse opinions than their government allows. Secondly, it shows that religious individuals, Muslims in this instance, are open to new ideas, if the elected leaders they desire, should possess that as a quality.¹¹²

Non-authoritarians were less likely to support disagreement and competition among political groups, a seemingly contradictory result to previously cited research.¹¹³ It may be that a more open environment for political debate might create a speech context in Morocco that would lead to political leaders less open to the views and opinion non-authoritarians hold. There is also the potential that prior to the elections and the crafting of a new constitution in 2011, religious party influence in government may increase, ensuring a more unfriendly environment towards their less religious and sometimes non-authoritarian neighbors.

In Morocco the majority of respondents did not feel free to criticize the government, which may come as result of the prevalence of censorship in the country.¹¹⁴ While the majority of Moroccans hold the view that they are not free to criticize their government, those who are the least likely to agree with the government, non-authoritarians, are also least likely to feel comfortable criticizing their government. As the number of laws relating to censorship of individuals

¹¹² Morocco, *World Factbook*, CIA, Available online at: www.cia.gov.

¹¹³ Canetti-Nisim (2004) and Downs and Cowan.

¹¹⁴ Mark Lynch, "Conversations 29 with Aboubakr Jamaï" *POMEPS Conversations* 8 NOV 2013, Available online at: www.pomeps.org.

critical of the regime attest, publicly expressing views opposing the King or his policies results in heavy-handed censorship or worse.¹¹⁵

Moroccan respondents were supportive of rights suppression in general, but authoritarian respondents were much more so. Since authoritarians defer to authority, anything that would cause instability to that authority's rule, like an open critique of the regime, would be unpopular with these individuals.¹¹⁶ Consequently, those respondents who were the most authoritarian, would feel that censorship could be justified in this instance. While commonly held assumptions are that authoritarians hold anti-freedom of speech attitudes, on the surface, some inconsistencies emerged. This was represented in the overwhelming support for both diversity in political opinions from both non-authoritarians and authoritarians.¹¹⁷ Moroccans support authoritarian style leadership. They defer to government for stability and security reasons, but are very supportive of leaders who are open to diverse opinions. These contradictions might be reconciled with the aforementioned role of the King, a king who possesses relative popularity through a well-crafted populist image.¹¹⁸ The significant cultural power held by the king is a tool used to benefit his

¹¹⁵ McCrackan, 165-173. And, Abdelslam Maghraoui, "The Preverse effect of Good Governance: Lessons from Morocco," *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 2 (2012): 50. "Morocco and its King: Popular but Prickly," *The Economist* August 27, 2009, www.economist.com/node/14327617. Mark Lynch, "Conversations 29 with Aboubakr Jamaï," *POMEPS Conversations* November 9, 2013, www.pomeps.org. See also, Andrew R. Smith, and Fadoua Loudiy, "Testing the Red Lines: On the Liberalization of Speech in Morocco," *Human Rights Quarterly* 27, no. 3 (2005): 1069-1119. Associated Press World Briefing, "Morocco: Prison Term for Insult to King," *The New York Times*, February 14, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com>. Interviews and stories such as these are common in Morocco.

¹¹⁶ Canetti-Nisim (2004), 377, 378, 382, 383, 388. And Lambe, 283, 284, Downs and Cowan, 1356.

¹¹⁷ Canetti-Nisim (2004) and Daphna Canetti-Nisim and Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, "The Effects of Authoritarianism, Religiosity, and "New Age" Beliefs on Support for Democracy: Unraveling the Strands." *Review of Religious Research* (2007): 369-384.

¹¹⁸ Aiden Lewis, "Why Has Morocco's King Survived the Arab Spring?," November 24, 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east>. "Morocco and its King: Popular but Prickly," *The Economist* 27 August 2009, <http://www.economist.com/node/14327617>. "Air France Sued After Pilot 'insults' King of Morocco," *France 24* February 11, 2013, <http://www.france24.com/en/20130211-air-france-king-mohammed-vi-morocco-insult/>.

regime, which allows him control over the Moroccan government and society, while remaining an unelected leader.¹¹⁹

If the government is not accountable to its citizens, and non-authoritarians are less likely to support that government, then it follows that their knowledge of democratic failures in the past might shape their relationship to further democratization processes.¹²⁰ Consequently, negative attitudes they possess towards the value of freedom of speech could be correlated to failures of the past as it relates to the continued strength of the Monarchy. Understanding that there is a relationship between peoples' attitudes towards democracy and essential elements of democracy, like freedom of speech, and their country context ensures that the nuanced, but still imperfect knowledge of Morocco can be ascertained. Even if all Moroccans thought democracy was the only system for Morocco, their definitions of what that looks like and what rights accompany that form of government may vary widely.

Lebanon

As the data revealed, the Lebanese have a relatively positive outlook and support for democrat rights. This includes civil rights like freedom of speech, which is measured by their openness to diverse political opinions. Even though the Lebanese system of government is highly religious, religion did not play the role that might be expected.¹²¹ The findings from this analysis show that there was no relationship to support for diverse political ideas and religiosity.

¹¹⁹ Maghraoui, 49-65.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Rogan, 216-217, 241-242 and 379-380.

Like Tessler (2002 and 2010), Jamal and Tessler (2008), Canetti-Nisim (2004) and Daphna Canetti-Nisim and Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi (2007) religiosity does not appear to be a barrier to freedom of speech nor comfort with expression in Lebanon. Since religious identity plays a central role in how the Lebanese relate to their government and society, religious individuals may feel they are at higher liberty to express their views. It seems that precisely because Lebanon has linked political power to religious sects, the religious are more comfortable to speak out against government.

Lebanese citizens possess highly non-authoritarian traits. They are overwhelmingly antagonistic towards rights suppression. However, they do not hold overly positive views of democracy for their nation, especially when one possesses non-authoritarian traits. This illustrates a society in struggle with its ideals in practice. In theory, they do not want authoritarian rule with its tools of suppression, but know that their democracy struggles, because of systemic problems that some suggest foster injustice.¹²²

Those who are authoritarian, who may even disagree with government policy, are more supportive of government and feel free to criticize it. Furthermore, authoritarians are more likely to agree in general with authorities, hence their claim to be more free to criticize government.¹²³ Their comfort in criticizing may come as a result of the fact that they would have less to criticize, leading to less negative interactions with government and less possibility for government censorship of their view. If the past history of censorship is an indication of Arab Barometer Wave I responses, it is safe to say that those most critical of the president, judges, individuals associated

¹²² Makdisi and Marktannerj.

¹²³ Canetti-Nisim (2004), 377, 378, 382, 383, 388. And Lambe, 283, 284, Downs and Cowan, 1356.

with these figures and any of the potentially “protected” government class, then these practices will continue.¹²⁴

Lebanese respondents were extremely supportive of diversity in opinion and disagreement among political groups as characteristics of their leaders. Disagreement seems to be an important and essential component of a healthy free speech context. Non-authoritarian respondents were noticeably less supportive when it came to the views with regards to ideological diversity in their political leaders. This might be explained within the context of the confessional system. As evidenced by Canetti-Nisim (2004), Lambe (2004) and Canetti-Nisim and Beit-Hallahmi’s (2007) research, authoritarians are more likely to possess negative attitudes towards diversity, and therefore, the converse could naturally be assumed about non-authoritarians. In a confessional system, government representatives are part of one’s “tribe.” If a leader of this group breaks ideological ranks, then one becomes less supportive of that leader. Consequently, ideological diversity may be discouraged. Because of the confessional system, one’s identified religious group is an important asset, and attacking that asset weakens one of your strengths, compromising you and your group’s place in society. Which, leads to inherent contradictions in relationships to freedom of speech and other important elements of democracy.

Lebanese responses to questions concerning democracy show far more support for the system in theory than in practice. While the Lebanese are decidedly pro-democracy and strongly opposed to authoritarian rule, the same cannot be said of their views when it comes to their own nation’s system of democracy. The authoritarians, as one might expect, were quite supportive of

¹²⁴ McCracken.

their system no matter its weaknesses.¹²⁵ However, those who are non-authoritarian were less so. They were more likely to disagree with their leaders and system of government, something confirmed by their dissatisfaction with their system of governance. Since all of the Lebanese are decidedly anti-authoritarian and pro-democracy, it would suggest that they want democracy.

VII. CONCLUSION

What impact does religion have on freedom of speech in countries such as Morocco and Lebanon? Does religious practice in Morocco and Lebanon suppress this freedom? The simple answer to the latter question is no, the data does not show religious individuals possessing anti-freedom of speech attitudes nor do they want to necessarily censor others. For example, in Lebanon, there was no statistical relationship between religiosity and freedom of expression, also suggesting that religion is not correlated with a desire for rights suppression. The socio-political context of Lebanon, which encourages public displays of religious expression, supports this conclusion.

Religion did not negatively relate to freedom of speech specifically. While religion may impact individual Moroccan and Lebanese in other contexts of analysis, it did not predict a negative relationship to freedom of expression. So how might these results help in understanding events such as the responses to both the Muhammad cartoons and the *Innocence of Muslims* movie trailer? In addition, how might it help analysis and interpretation of the religion in the MENA going forward?

¹²⁵ Canetti-Nisim (2004), 377, 378, 382, 383, 388. And, Lambe, 283, 284, Downs and Cowan, 1356.

First, applying results from two specific groups of respondents to respondents from other parts of the world presents significant problems, as has been noted throughout this work. So attempting to apply a conclusion from a significant and reliable set of data, requires a level of care. Just as importantly, it requires that the context of every site of analysis be weighed and considered. In addition to this caution, assuming that all those who were outraged over events such as the Muhammad cartoons, were so only because they were religious and Muslims presents another set of issues. While it may be true that many protesters were both religious and Muslim, generalizing the cause of outrage to be a result of them being religious and Muslim does not always align with the available data. Even if one assumed they were all religious Muslims, this work showed that religious Muslims are not inherently opposed to free expression. This leads one to conclude that opposition to the cartoons was not solely caused by the religiosity of the individual, and going forward, incidents involving Muslims need not only be analyzed within a religious context.

These complexities are better understood through an expansion of the research. Islam is understood to be compatible with democracy. A Muslim's interpretation of his or her faith readily blends with democracy in practice. The democratic evolution and maturation in the MENA has demanded a deeper understanding of individual level attitudes in the finer points of democracy. Operating under the assumption that having elections and crafting constitutions will make a people free and able to live in a representative democracy, constructs a limited view of a society. Morocco is a society which conducts elections and possesses a newly crafted constitution, and yet wide-spread censorship continues.

This analysis of the Arab Barometer Wave I has brought valuable insight to literature examining democratization in the region. The recent Arab political uprisings come as a result of much change, and data reflects this change; Muslims in Morocco and Lebanon view democracy and freedom of expression positively. The importance of these findings cannot be minimized. It suggests that popular outrage over a number of religiously charged images does not necessarily have to be viewed in only one context: Islam versus Democracy and Muslims against freedom of speech. Rather a more nuanced understanding is required, one which acknowledges that a Muslims' attitudes toward freedom of expression is not solely motivated by his or her religious beliefs. In addition, as numerous MENA nations continue to wrestle with ideas and concepts associated with fledgling democratic processes, conclusions from Morocco and Lebanon can help inform analysis regarding the region. Like Morocco and Lebanon, these almost exclusively Muslim societies do not need only to be viewed by their religious practice, when it concerns democracy and rights associated with them. As a way of not overgeneralizing the results of this research, it is important to note that while Moroccan and Lebanese attitudes towards freedom of speech is not a function of their religiosity, one might find this to be true in other countries. Again, the importance of this relates to the fact that Muslims need not always be viewed as possessing negative attitudes towards democracy and more specifically freedom of speech. Consequently, what the future holds for countries in the MENA as it relates to democracy will be as varied as the people that make them up.

If people of countries like Morocco and Lebanon are getting the government they deserve, then why do they hold attitudes toward freedom of speech that are not in line with the levels of censorship used by their governments? This subject is so complex, and it seems any num-

ber of issues could be the cause for this inconsistency. Strong individual level support has not always resulted in a free and open press, or a context for other forms of speech and expression. Nations made up of people who are supportive of democracy and freedom of expression, probably will not remain censored forever. Finally, religion is not a predictor for anti-freedom of speech attitudes. Arguments being made to the contrary are assumptions not consistent with the available data.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 1 — Proportion of Religious/Non-Religious Respondent's Views in Comfort in Criticizing Government in Morocco			
Respondent Feels Free to Criticize their Government	Pray (Yes)	Pray (No)	Total
Strongly Agree	15.43 (152)	5.88 (12)	13.79 (164)
Somewhat Agree	24.87 (246)	22.55 (46)	24.56 (292)
Somewhat Disagree	36.14 (356)	39.22 (80)	36.67 (436)
Strongly Disagree	23.45 (231)	32.35 (66)	24.98 (297)
Total	100.00 (985)	100.00 (204)	100.00 (1,189)
Pearson Chi 2(3) = 17.3732	Pr = 0.001		

TABLE 2 — Proportion of Religious/Non-Religious Respondent's Views in Comfort in Criticizing Government in Lebanon			
Respondent Feels Free to Criticize their Government	Pray (Yes)	Pray (No)	Total
Strongly Agree	46.14 (466)	41.18 (70)	45.42 (536)
Somewhat Agree	41.58 (420)	50.00 (85)	42.80 (505)
Somewhat Disagree	8.02 (81)	5.88 (10)	7.71 (91)
Strongly Disagree	4.26 (43)	2.94 (5)	4.07 (48)
Total	100.00 (1,010)	100.00 (170)	100.00 (1,189)
Pearson Chi 2(3) = 4.6786	Pr = 0.197		

TABLE 3 — Proportion of Religious/Non-Religious Respondent's Views on Factors that Make a Leader Qualified for Political Office in Morocco			
Importance of Openness to Diverse Political Ideas as Qualification for Political Offices	Pray (Yes)	Pray (No)	Total
Very Important	62.80 (633)	48.86 (107)	60.31 (740)
Important	28.87 (291)	37.44 (82)	30.40 (373)
Somewhat Unimportant	4.96 (50)	9.59 (21)	5.79 (71)
Not Important at All	3.37 (34)	4.11 (9)	3.50 (43)
Total	100.00 (1,008)	100.00 (219)	100.00 (1,185)
Pearson Chi 2(3) = 17.0868	Pr = 0.001		

TABLE 4 — Proportion of Religious/Non-Religious Respondent's Views on Factors that Make a Leader Qualified for Political Office in Lebanon			
Importance of Openness to Diverse Political Ideas as Qualification for Political Offices	Pray (Yes)	Pray (No)	Total
Very Important	77.10 (781)	80.23 (138)	77.55 (919)
Important	211 (20.83)	19.19 (33)	20.59 (244)
Somewhat Unimportant	1.58 (16)	0.00 (0)	1.35 (16)
Not Important at All	0.49 (5)	0.58 (1)	0.51 (6)
Total	100.00 (1,013)	100.00 (172)	100.00 (1,185)
Pearson Chi 2(3) = 3.1182	Pr = 0.374		

TABLE 5— Proportion of Religious/Non-Religious Respondent’s Views on Comfort with Justification for Rights Suppression in the **Morocco**

To What Degree Would You Agree that the Violation of Human rights Was Justified in the Name of Security and Stability?	Pray (Yes)	Pray (No)	Total
Completely Justified	39.73 (408)	45.91 (101)	40.82 (509)
Justified	26.78 275	24.09 (53)	26.30 (328)
Not Very Justified	11.78 121	12.27 (27)	11.87 (148)
Not Justifiable at All	21.71 (223)	17.73 (39)	21.01 (262)
Total	100.00 (1,027)	100.00 (220)	100.00 (1,247)
Pearson Chi 2(3) = 3.6005	Pr = 0.308		

TABLE 6— Proportion of Religious/Non-Religious Respondent’s Views on Comfort with Justification for Rights Suppression in the **Lebanon**

To What Degree Would You Agree that the Violation of Human rights Was Justified in the Name of Security and Stability?	Pray (Yes)	Pray (No)	Total
Completely Justified	4.29 (42)	4.07 (7)	4.26 (49)
Justified	11.54 (113)	6.98 (12)	10.86 (125)
Not Very Justified	10.32 (101)	7.56 (13)	9.90 (114)
Not Justifiable at All	73.85 (723)	81.40 (140)	74.98 (863)
Total	100.00 (979)	100.00 (172)	100.0 (1,151)
Pearson Chi 2(3) = 5.0593	Pr = 0.168		

TABLE 7—Frequency and Proportion of Moroccans Who Are Authoritarian/Non-Authoritarian Preferences for Disagreement and Competition Among Political Groups in **Morocco**

Agreement with Competition and Diversity Among Political Groups	Strongly Authoritarian	Authoritarian	Non-Authoritarian	Strongly Non-Authoritarian	Total
Strongly Agree	47.23 (162)	42.02 (137)	37.70 (72)	42.23 (87)	42.96 (458)
Somewhat Agree	36.73 (126)	37.12 (121)	36.13 (69)	27.67 (57)	34.99 373
Somewhat Disagree	9.33 (32)	12.88 (42)	16.75 (32)	14.56 (30)	12.76 (136)
Strongly Disagree	6.71 (23)	7.98 (26)	9.42 (18)	15.53 (32)	9.29 99
Total	100.00 (343)	100.00 (326)	100.00 (191)	100.00 (206)	100.00 1,066
Pearson Chi 2(9) = 24.5301	Pr = 0.004				

TABLE 8—Frequency and Proportion of Lebanese Who Are Authoritarian/Non-Authoritarian Preferences for Disagreement and Competition Among Political Groups in **Lebanon**

Agreement with Competition and Diversity Among Political Groups	Strongly Authoritarian	Authoritarian	Non-Authoritarian	Strongly Non-Authoritarian	Total
Strongly Agree	45.10 (46)	38.60 (83)	22.53 (82)	33.78 (152)	32.10 363
Somewhat Agree	17.65 (18)	35.35 (76)	42.86 (156)	28.89 (130)	33.60 (380)
Somewhat Disagree	15.69 (16)	12.09 (26)	21.43 (78)	11.56 (52)	15.21 172
Strongly Disagree	21.57 (22)	13.95 (30)	13.19 (48)	25.78 (116)	19.81 (224)
Total	100.00 (102)	100.00 (215)	100.00 (364)	100.00 (450)	100.00 (1,131)
Pearson Chi2(9) = 74.2439	Pr = 0.000				

TABLE 9— and Freedom/Comfort to Criticize Their Government					
Freedom to Criticize Government	Strongly Authoritarian	Authoritarian	Non-Authoritarian	Strongly Non-Authoritarian	Total
Strongly Agree	15.01 (53)	12.24 (42)	10.43 (22)	20.27 (45)	42.96 (162)
Somewhat Agree	29.46 (104)	28.57 (98)	20.85 (44)	15.77 (35)	34.99 (281)
Somewhat Disagree	32.01 (113)	38.78 (133)	49.76 (105)	24.32 (54)	12.76 (405)
Strongly Disagree	23.51 (83)	20.41 (70)	18.96 (40)	39.64 (88)	9.29 (281)
Total	100.00 (353)	100.00 (343)	100.00 (211)	100.00 (222)	100.00 (1,129)
Pearson Chi 2(9) = 69.7940	Pr = 0.000				

TABLE 10— Preferences and Freedom/Comfort to Criticize their Government					
Freedom to Criticize Government	Strongly Authoritarian	Authoritarian	Non-Authoritarian	Strongly Non-Authoritarian	Total
Strongly Agree	69.61 (71)	46.73 (100)	28.46 (105)	54.42 (246)	42.96 (522)
Somewhat Agree	20.59 (21)	43.93 (94)	61.52 (227)	31.19 (141)	34.99 (483)
Somewhat Disagree	5.88 (6)	6.54 (14)	7.86 (29)	8.41 (38)	12.76 (87)
Strongly Disagree	3.92 (4)	2.80 (6)	2.17 (8)	5.97 (27)	9.29 (45)
Total	100.00 (102)	100.00 (214)	100.00 (369)	100.00 (452)	100.00 (1,137)
Pearson Chi 2(9) = 110.2460	Pr = 0.000				


FIGURE 1—Frequency and Proportion of Moroccans and Lebanese Who Have Authoritarian/Non-Authoritarian Preferences and Their Attitudes Towards the Justifiability of the Violation of Human Rights in the Name of Security and Stability

MOROCCO

LEBANON

■ Not Justified at All ■ Not very Justified ■ Somewhat Justified ■ Completely Justified

120



*SA-Strongly Authoritarian

Auth-Authoritarian

NA-Non-Authoritarian

SNA-Strongly Non-Authoritarian

Pearson Chi2(9) = 75.5875
Pr = 0.000

Pearson Chi2(9) = 21.6409
Pr = 0.010

TABLE 11 —Degree by Which Authoritarian/Non-Authoritarians are Open to Diverse Opinions is an Important Qualification for Political Office in					
Openness to Diverse Political Ideas	Strongly Authoritarian	Authoritarian	Non-Authoritarian	Strongly Non-Authoritarian	Total
Very Important	65.23 (242)	67.71 (237)	50.45 (112)	57.27 (126)	61.65 (717)
Important	30.19 (112)	26.86 (94)	44.14 (98)	23.18 (51)	30.52 (355)
Unimportant	3.77 (14)	4.29 (15)	3.60 (8)	10.00 (22)	5.07 (59)
Not Important at All	0.81 (3)	1.14 (4)	1.80 (4)	9.55 (21)	2.75 (32)
Total	100.00 (371)	100.00 (350)	100.00 (222)	100.00 (220)	100.00 (1,163)
Pearson Chi2(3) = 5.0593	Pr = 0.000				

TABLE 12 —Important Qualification for Political Office in					
Openness to Diverse Political Ideas	Strongly Authoritarian	Authoritarian	Non-Authoritarian	Strongly Non-Authoritarian	Total
Very Important	83.50 (86)	81.02 (175)	69.73 (258)	81.19 (367)	77.65 (886)
Important	14.56 (15)	18.98 (41)	27.03 (100)	17.48 (79)	20.60 (235)
Unimportant	1.94 (2)	0.00 (0)	2.16 (8)	1.11 (5)	1.31 (15)
Not Important at All	0.00 (0)	0.00 (0)	1.08 (4)	0.22 (1)	0.44 (5)
Total	100.00 (103)	100.00 (216)	100.00 (370)	100.00 (452)	100.00 (1,141)
Person Chi2(9) = 26.8381	Pr = 0.001				

TABLE 13—Frequency and Proportion of Moroccans who are Male and Female Views on Disagreement and Competition Among Political Groups in

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Competition among Political Groups is not a bad thing for our country	Male	Female	Total
Strongly Agree	47.13 (255)	39.22 (222)	43.09 (477)
Agree	30.50 (165)	37.63 (213)	34.15 (378)
Somewhat Disagree	11.65 (63)	14.13 (80)	12.92 (143)
Strongly Disagree	10.72 (58)	9.01 (51)	9.85 (109)
Total	100.00 (541)	100.00 (566)	100.00 (1,107)
Pearson Chi2(3) = 10.2894	Pr = 0.016		

TABLE 14—Frequency and Proportion of system of Governance for

	Male	Female	Total
Very Good	68.47 (469)	67.00 (335)	67.85 (804)
Good	24.38 (167)	26.60 (133)	25.32 (300)
Bad	4.96 (34)	4.80 (24)	4.89 (58)
Very Bad	2.19 (15)	1.60 (8)	1.94 (23)
Total	100.00 (685)	100.00 (500)	100.00 (1,185)
Pearson Chi2(3) = 1.1883	Pr = 0.756		

TABLE 15 —Frequency and Proportion of System of Governance for			
	Male	Female	Total
Very Good	70.40 (402)	64.79 (403)	67.48 (805)
Good	24.69 (141)	31.83 (198)	28.42 (339)
Bad	2.45 (14)	2.57 (16)	2.51 (30)
Very Bad	2.45 (14)	0.80 (5)	1.59 (19)
Total	100.00 (571)	100.00 (622)	100.00 (1,193)
Pearson Chi2(3) = 11.8232	Pr = 0.008		

TABLE 16 —Frequency and Proportion of Lebanese Who Are Male and Female Views on Disagreement and Competition Among Political Groups in			
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Competition among Political Groups is not a bad thing for our country	Male	Female	Total
Strongly Agree	36.73 (249)	25.67 (127)	32.11 (376)
Agree	33.48 (227)	33.47 (165)	33.48 (392)
Somewhat Disagree	13.42 (91)	17.65 (87)	15.20 (178)
Strongly Disagree	16.37 (111)	23.12 (114)	19.21 (225)
Total	100.00 (678)	100.00 (493)	100.00 (1,171)
Pearson Chi2(3) = 20.8134	Pr = 0.000		

TABLE 17 —Frequency and Proportion of Governance for								
Democracy as System of Governance	Illiterate	Elementary Education	Primary Education	Secondary Education	College Degree	BA	MA or Higher	Total
Very Good	64.00 (16)	70.21 (66)	55.36 (160)	66.55 (187)	74.52 (79)	75.35 (266)	81.08 (30)	67.85 (804)
Good	32.00 (8)	20.21 19	32.18 (93)	27.40 (77)	16.98 (18)	22.66 (80)	13.51 (5)	25.32 (300)
Bad	4.00 (1)	7.45 (7)	8.30 (24)	4.63 (13)	6.60 (7)	1.42 (5)	2.70 (1)	4.89 (58)
Very Bad	0.00 (0)	2.13 (2)	4.15 (12)	1.42 (4)	1.89 (2)	0.57 (2)	2.70 (1)	1.94 (23)
Total	100.00 (25)	100.00 (94)	100.00 (289)	100.00 (281)	100.00 (106)	100.00 (353)	100.00 (37)	100.00 (1,185)
Person Chi2(18) = 54.2580	Pr = 0.000							

TABLE 18—Frequency and Proportion of Governance for

Democracy as System of Governance	Illiterate	Elementary Education	Primary Education	Secondary Education	College Degree	BA	MA or Higher	Total
Very Good	70.02 (327)	66.78 (197)	64.18 (129)	64.76 (68)	70.59 (12)	58.82 (20)	70.27 (52)	67.48 (805)
Good	25.05 (117)	29.83 (88)	31.34 63	33.33 (35)	29.41 (5)	38.24 (13)	24.32 (18)	28.42 (339)
Bad	3.00 (14)	1.36 (4)	2.99 (6)	1.90 (2)	0.00 (0)	2.94 (1)	4.05 (3)	2.51 (30)
Very Bad	1.93 (9)	2.03 (6)	1.49 (3)	0.00 (0)	0.00 (0)	0.00 (0)	1.35 (1)	1.59 (19)
Total	100.00 (467)	100.00 (295)	100.00 (201)	100.00 (105)	100.00 (17)	100.00 (34)	100.00 (74)	100.00 (1,193)
Person Chi2(18) = 13.2597	Pr = 0.776							