Why do they fight? Explaining participation in the War in Croatia

Abstract

This project explains voluntary participation in the War in Croatia, using a data set of daily interval event data and interviews with Croatian war veterans. It challenges the previous findings of macro level based research on conflict and the literature's emphasis on material incentives as the prime motive for individual participation in war. Conversely, my findings show that the biggest influence on mass participation was the escalation of violent events. Using a generalized linear model I observe significant differences in the number of violent events in each of Croatia's 120 municipalities and the number of individuals who enlisted in the Croat armed forces. Secondly, I show that the earliest joiners belonged to Croatia's dissident community; however, rather than observing these individuals' grievances as the most crucial variable in their decision to participate, I show that in fact, the first fighters joined as a result of social incentives and pressures. Finally, I test the early months of the conflict and show that the fighting was stable. I then explain why the conflict remained in equilibrium by looking at disincentives local and central elites had in reestablishing peace. In the end I reveal that while material incentives were unimportant in mobilizing individuals at the mass level, war profiteering at the elite level provides us with a better understanding of why once started, the conflict was unlikely to stop.