Philosophy Dissertations and Theseshttps://hdl.handle.net/1808/139862024-03-28T19:48:11Z2024-03-28T19:48:11ZThomistic Approaches to Welfare TheoryHayes, Michaelhttps://hdl.handle.net/1808/298812021-03-05T16:53:01Z2019-05-31T00:00:00ZThomistic Approaches to Welfare Theory
Hayes, Michael
The purpose of this work is primarily to defend the Thomistic approach to well-being on three fronts. First, it is often said that objective theories of well-being are vulnerable to the objection that, if well-being is objective, someone’s good might not sufficiently resonate with him or her. That is, objectivist theories suffer because they fail to meet the “internalist” constraint. I argue, however, that a Thomistic theory of well-being—objective though it is—is not vulnerable to this criticism. Second, it has been argued that perfectionist theories of well-being (like Aquinas’) cannot accommodate the intuition that pleasure and “cheap thrills” positively contribute to human well-being. I argue that a Thomistic theory of well-being can indeed affirm the intrinsic goodness of pleasure and “cheap thrills.” Finally, I argue—against the objections of other scholars—that a singular analysis of relational goodness (i.e. x is good for y) is possible. This singular analysis is grounded in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and, I believe, can helpfully inform our discussions about human well-being.
2019-05-31T00:00:00ZA Defense of the Moral Praiseworthiness of AngerPorter, Benjamin Isaachttps://hdl.handle.net/1808/279562019-08-27T18:10:28Z2018-08-31T00:00:00ZA Defense of the Moral Praiseworthiness of Anger
Porter, Benjamin Isaac
In this paper, I challenge criticisms concerning the moral use of anger in recent debates. Recently criticisms have emerged claiming that anger either always carries with it an irrational desire or that anger causes one to habituate negative character traits. I challenge the conception of anger which leads to these objections by appealing to our common notions and intuitions concerning the emotion. I then provide an account of anger as a desire to overcome impediments to our general well-being with a focus on human dignity. I argue that my account of anger does not fall victim to these criticism and conclude that the emotion of anger properly constrained can be used in a morally praiseworthy manner.
2018-08-31T00:00:00ZHow Can Human Intelligence Collection Be Morally Justified?Doty, Reecehttps://hdl.handle.net/1808/279132019-08-27T18:09:09Z2018-05-31T00:00:00ZHow Can Human Intelligence Collection Be Morally Justified?
Doty, Reece
This paper is an exploration of the ethics of espionage, specifically as it pertains to the human dimension. In it, I discuss the ethical aspects of some specific cases and questions about which moral theory we should use to evaluate and guide human intelligence (HUMINT) collection operations. The topic will be explored through three major sections. The first section concerns some initial philosophical considerations and questions of the self. The second section is a presentation and analysis of three hypothetical case studies from the field. The final section is a much broader look at the socio-political considerations that are relevant to HUMINT collection. It is my contention that justifying cases of HUMINT collection outside of a utilitarian construct is a challenge. While most HUMINT operations are best justified by utilitarian moral theories, justifying all HUMINT operations in terms of a utilitarian construct creates the potential risk of justifying acts that are so morally egregious that they should never be committed regardless of the potentially positive consequences.
2018-05-31T00:00:00ZConstructivism and the Liberal DilemmaEftekhari, Seenahttps://hdl.handle.net/1808/278782019-08-27T18:09:08Z2018-05-31T00:00:00ZConstructivism and the Liberal Dilemma
Eftekhari, Seena
In this dissertation I show that constructivist liberal philosophers are confronted by a dilemma. On the one hand, the conceptions of persons that they appeal to are so thin that contradictory conclusions can be derived from those very same conceptions. Where one philosopher thinks that his or her conception excludes the capitalistic economic liberties from the list of basic rights, it is possible to show with great plausibility the opposite conclusion and vice-versa. The status of the capitalist economic liberties carries significant implications not only for the structure of the economy but also for the place and role of other normative values that more directly affect other areas of life. If it can be shown that a conception of persons leads to contradictory results when it comes to the status of the economic liberties in particular, then the general shape of society will change in significant and inevitable ways as well. In order to avoid this horn of the dilemma, some philosophers seek to thicken their conceptions of persons. In doing so, I maintain that they come to beg too many questions and subsequently undermine whatever normative conclusions they sought to derive from their conception of persons. I analyze this connection within the context of the theories of political philosophers writing from different traditions of liberal thought. To do so I first distinguish between how the concept of personhood has been employed in moral philosophy as opposed to political philosophy. The chapters then move from liberal theories more progressively oriented, such as John Rawls’s theory of justice, to more moderate positions, such as John Tomasi’s market democracy, to Robert Nozick’s libertarianism. In the first two cases I argue that the conceptions of persons employed by Rawls and Tomasi are thin, and that it is possible to show that their conceptions lead to conclusions in conflict with their own stated positions. In the case of libertarianism, I argue that libertarians generally construe self-ownership thickly by including the economic liberties within its very definition, rather than appealing to self-ownership in order to derive those liberties.
2018-05-31T00:00:00Z