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Westmoreland’s and Abrams’ Lieutenants: Field Force Commanders of the Vietnam War, 1965–1971
Griswold, Brendan
Griswold, Brendan
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Abstract
Historians have long debated whether the Vietnam War was winnable for the UnitedStates (U.S.) and its allies. While orthodox scholars view the war as unwinnable, revisionistsbelieve the war could have been won if alternative courses of action had been taken. Nohistorian, however, has yet examined the outcome of the Vietnam War from the perspective ofU.S. Army field force commanders. This dissertation fills this gap. Ultimately, this study arguesthat the war was unwinnable, for the strategy imposed on the Army from Washington—that is, adefensive war of attrition—prevented the defeat of Communist military forces, negated efforts toconnect the South Vietnamese people to the government in Saigon, and kept the SouthVietnamese military from becoming fully capable of defending its own country. This dissertationfurther shows that the field force commanders’ prior experience generally well prepared them forfield force command. With each facing a unique situation and a host of challenges, field forcecommanders were, with some exceptions, generally successful, given the situation each faced atthe time. In advancing U.S. political objectives, however, these leaders were largelyunsuccessful, primarily due to the employment of U.S. ground forces on the strategic defense.
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Date
2023-01-01
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University of Kansas
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This item contains archived web content.
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989195_1.pdf
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- Embargoed until 2173-05-31
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Keywords
Military history, American history, Abrams, Counterinsurgency, Field Force Commanders, U.S. Army, Vietnam War, Westmoreland