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Why Sensations Must be Neurological Properties: A Defense of the Identity Theory
Simmons, Nicholas Keith
Simmons, Nicholas Keith
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Abstract
In this dissertation, I defend the thesis that qualitative mental states known as qualia (e.g., tastes, feelings, pains) are identical to physical properties. In Chapter 1, I argue that qualia have a functional role in the world, and that is to facilitate non-automatic mental processes. In Chapter 2, I demonstrate how non-reductive accounts of the mind fail. In Chapter 3, I demonstrate how my reductive account fares better than similar accounts with respect to common and contemporary objections. In Chapter 4, I address arguments against any view like mine which seeks to understand qualia in a physicalistic framework.
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Date
2013-05-31
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University of Kansas
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Keywords
Philosophy, Brain, Consciousness, Mind, Qualia