Loading...
Why Sensations Must be Neurological Properties: A Defense of the Identity Theory
Simmons, Nicholas Keith
Simmons, Nicholas Keith
Citations
Altmetric:
Abstract
In this dissertation, I defend the thesis that qualitative mental states known as qualia (e.g., tastes, feelings, pains) are identical to physical properties. In Chapter 1, I argue that qualia have a functional role in the world, and that is to facilitate non-automatic mental processes. In Chapter 2, I demonstrate how non-reductive accounts of the mind fail. In Chapter 3, I demonstrate how my reductive account fares better than similar accounts with respect to common and contemporary objections. In Chapter 4, I address arguments against any view like mine which seeks to understand qualia in a physicalistic framework.
Description
Date
2013-05-31
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
University of Kansas
Archive Status
This item contains archived web content.
Files
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Keywords
Philosophy, Brain, Consciousness, Mind, Qualia