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UNIQUENESS OF RESPONSIVE VOTING EQUILIBRIUM

Dalkir, Elif
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Abstract
I consider a voting model in which voters receive private signals about a state variable that affects the utility of voters. There is a continuum of signals, normally distributed conditional on the state variable. I characterize a sufficient condition under which there does not exist any asymmetric equilibria. Therefore, for any plurality rule, the unique responsive equilibrium is symmetric.
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2008-01-01
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University of Kansas
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DALKIR_ku_0099D_10103_DATA_1.pdf
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Mathematics, Economics, Finance, Economic theory, Asymmetric information, Collective decision making, Information aggregation, Responsive bayesian-nash equilibrium, Stability, Strategic voting
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https://hdl.handle.net/1808/4345
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