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Publication Thomistic Approaches to Welfare Theory(University of Kansas, 2019-05-31) Hayes, Michael; Dorsey, DaleThe purpose of this work is primarily to defend the Thomistic approach to well-being on three fronts. First, it is often said that objective theories of well-being are vulnerable to the objection that, if well-being is objective, someone’s good might not sufficiently resonate with him or her. That is, objectivist theories suffer because they fail to meet the “internalist” constraint. I argue, however, that a Thomistic theory of well-being—objective though it is—is not vulnerable to this criticism. Second, it has been argued that perfectionist theories of well-being (like Aquinas’) cannot accommodate the intuition that pleasure and “cheap thrills” positively contribute to human well-being. I argue that a Thomistic theory of well-being can indeed affirm the intrinsic goodness of pleasure and “cheap thrills.” Finally, I argue—against the objections of other scholars—that a singular analysis of relational goodness (i.e. x is good for y) is possible. This singular analysis is grounded in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and, I believe, can helpfully inform our discussions about human well-being.Publication A Defense of the Moral Praiseworthiness of Anger(University of Kansas, 2018-08-31) Porter, Benjamin Isaac; Symons, John; Cokelet, Brad; Maley, Corey JIn this paper, I challenge criticisms concerning the moral use of anger in recent debates. Recently criticisms have emerged claiming that anger either always carries with it an irrational desire or that anger causes one to habituate negative character traits. I challenge the conception of anger which leads to these objections by appealing to our common notions and intuitions concerning the emotion. I then provide an account of anger as a desire to overcome impediments to our general well-being with a focus on human dignity. I argue that my account of anger does not fall victim to these criticism and conclude that the emotion of anger properly constrained can be used in a morally praiseworthy manner.Publication How Can Human Intelligence Collection Be Morally Justified?(University of Kansas, 2018-05-31) Doty, Reece; Cokelet, Bradford; Eggleston, Ben; Dorsey, DaleThis paper is an exploration of the ethics of espionage, specifically as it pertains to the human dimension. In it, I discuss the ethical aspects of some specific cases and questions about which moral theory we should use to evaluate and guide human intelligence (HUMINT) collection operations. The topic will be explored through three major sections. The first section concerns some initial philosophical considerations and questions of the self. The second section is a presentation and analysis of three hypothetical case studies from the field. The final section is a much broader look at the socio-political considerations that are relevant to HUMINT collection. It is my contention that justifying cases of HUMINT collection outside of a utilitarian construct is a challenge. While most HUMINT operations are best justified by utilitarian moral theories, justifying all HUMINT operations in terms of a utilitarian construct creates the potential risk of justifying acts that are so morally egregious that they should never be committed regardless of the potentially positive consequences.Publication Constructivism and the Liberal Dilemma(University of Kansas, 2018-05-31) Eftekhari, Seena; Cudd, Ann; Dorsey, Dale; Cokelet, Brad; Eggleston, Ben; Rasmussen, David; Tsvetanov, TsvetanIn this dissertation I show that constructivist liberal philosophers are confronted by a dilemma. On the one hand, the conceptions of persons that they appeal to are so thin that contradictory conclusions can be derived from those very same conceptions. Where one philosopher thinks that his or her conception excludes the capitalistic economic liberties from the list of basic rights, it is possible to show with great plausibility the opposite conclusion and vice-versa. The status of the capitalist economic liberties carries significant implications not only for the structure of the economy but also for the place and role of other normative values that more directly affect other areas of life. If it can be shown that a conception of persons leads to contradictory results when it comes to the status of the economic liberties in particular, then the general shape of society will change in significant and inevitable ways as well. In order to avoid this horn of the dilemma, some philosophers seek to thicken their conceptions of persons. In doing so, I maintain that they come to beg too many questions and subsequently undermine whatever normative conclusions they sought to derive from their conception of persons. I analyze this connection within the context of the theories of political philosophers writing from different traditions of liberal thought. To do so I first distinguish between how the concept of personhood has been employed in moral philosophy as opposed to political philosophy. The chapters then move from liberal theories more progressively oriented, such as John Rawls’s theory of justice, to more moderate positions, such as John Tomasi’s market democracy, to Robert Nozick’s libertarianism. In the first two cases I argue that the conceptions of persons employed by Rawls and Tomasi are thin, and that it is possible to show that their conceptions lead to conclusions in conflict with their own stated positions. In the case of libertarianism, I argue that libertarians generally construe self-ownership thickly by including the economic liberties within its very definition, rather than appealing to self-ownership in order to derive those liberties.Publication On the Efficacy of Character Education for Cultivating Virtue(University of Kansas, 2018-05-31) Bednar, Katarina; Frykholm, Erin; Dorsey, Dale; Eggleston, Ben; Cokelet, Bradford; Patterson, MeaganThis dissertation serves to support deliberate attempts to cultivate moral character. Character education faces criticism, some of which are inherited from its grounding in virtue theory. The aim of this dissertation is to confront these particular critiques and show that they can be answered in an effort to vindicate the prospects of character education. When philosophers question whether character traits are stable and robust in the way that virtue theory posits them to be, a similar problem holds for character education: is there any point to character education if character does not exist in the way we traditionally think about it? I appropriate Christian Miller’s Mixed Traits framework to show that character education can handle standard situationist challenges that maintain that our environments are better predictors of our behaviors than our characters. Another problem concerns the possibility of developing the kinds of character traits that character education dictates. I defend the possibility, motivated in part by the work of Michael Slote, Nancy Snow, and others. I argue that active cultivation is not only the most promising method for character development, it is also necessary for becoming virtuous. I defend a two-tier approach to character and virtue acquisition that is skill-based, and involves teaching and fostering skills of self-awareness, perception, and responsiveness. My account faces opposition on grounds that various influences can interfere in the process of cultivation. Eric Schwitzgebel and Jennifer Saul raise skepticism regarding the extent to which we can rely on our mental faculties, and Heather Battaly challenges the role environment can play in virtue development. I recognize the call for strategies to overcome both internal and external influences and respond by drawing on contemporary empirical research. Teaching skills of self-awareness, perception, and responsiveness, and offering opportunities to practice these skills will enable students to become virtuous. This project is grounded in and motivated by philosophical, psychological, and educational research. It proposes a realistic and empirically supported approach to character development. I am optimistic that a skill-based approach will enable students to become virtuous, and hopeful that it will be implemented in curriculum in the future.Publication An Examination of Thomas Hurka's Virtue Consequentialism(University of Kansas, 2017-12-31) Rose, Crystal; Frykholm, Erin; Eggleston, Ben; Cokelet, Brad; Tuozzo, Tom; Gordon, PamelaIn this dissertation, I examine three separate issues pertaining to Thomas Hurka’s virtue consequentialism. Hurka’s account describes virtue as a positive orientation towards a good, and a vice as a negative orientation towards a good. The three goods that Hurka assigns to his theory are: pleasure, achievement, and knowledge. In my first paper I argue that an indirect approach to virtue development is more effective than a direct approach. I propose that an individual will have an easier time becoming virtuous if he works on cultivating his empathy, and being guided by a rational commitment to promoting the goods, rather than depending strictly on his willpower, and a rational commitment to promoting the goods. In the second paper I criticize Hurka’s definition of humility, and argue for my own account. Hurka characterizes humility as an asymmetrical recognition of goods. We might inflate the goods of others even though they are equal to our own, or we might deflate our own compared to the equal goods of others. I argue that this conflicts with his theory of virtue, and does not capture what is valuable about humility. I provide my own account of humility as a skill utilized by mentors. The third paper argues that Hurka’s account of virtue does not accurately describe intrinsic value, and therefore would be rejected by virtue ethicists. His account is committed to describing the intrinsic value of virtue as part of a conditional organic unity. I argue that this is different from the intrinsic value argued for by traditional virtue ethicists.Publication Some remarks concerning the general theory of human social praxis and its relation to ethical theory(University of Kansas, 1978) Abugattas, Juan A.Publication Against the Linguistic Strategy for the Ontic Conception of Scientific Explanation(University of Kansas, 2017-05-31) Fensholt, Rebecca Janell; Robins, Sarah; Eggleston, Ben; Schulz, ArminPhilosophers of science are interested in characterizing the nature of scientific explanation. Much of the debate has been about which format or structures best represent, and thus explain, scientific phenomena. Pushing back against these representational views, Craver has been developing an ontic account of scientific explanation. According to this view, explanations are not representations of things in the real world but are the things in the world themselves. In a recent paper, Craver (2013) argues in favor of the ontic view by appeal to our use of the word ‘explain.’ In this paper, I evaluate Craver’s linguistic strategy and argue that it fails to provide support for the ontic view. Craver introduces a distinction between four senses of ‘explain’ and argues that one sense - the ontic sense - is the literal and foundational sense. This is taken to justify the ontic view. In this paper, I argue that linguistic tests for primacy do not privilege the ontic sense of ‘explain,’ and in fact, indicate that the ontic sense is subordinate. I conclude by raising some general questions about the merits of the linguistic strategy as method of justification for the ontic view of scientific explanation.Publication ORGANISMS AND THE EXTENDED SELF: A RE-EVALUATION(University of Kansas, 2016-05-31) Carlyle, Arthur Carlyle; Schulz, Armin; Robins, Sarah; Maley, Corey J.In this paper I argue against Eric Olson, who argues that the extended mind thesis must be false if animalism—the view that human persons are numerically identical with biological organisms—is true. Whilst I agree with Olson that the animalist’s approach is the best account of personal identity, I disagree with his position regarding the extended mind thesis. I argue, contrary to Olson, that understanding human beings as organisms leads to the acceptance of a version of the EST. This is important also, as it shows that one need not have any commitments to the EMT to accept the EST.Publication LIFE AND DEATH ISSUES IN BIOETHICS: ABORTION, PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATE, AND THE DEFINITION OF DEATH(University of Kansas, 2015-12-31) McDaniel, Ian Keith; Symons, John; Marquis, Donald; Dorsey, Dale; Eggleston, Ben; Frykholm, Erin; Scott, PaulThis dissertation is comprised of three papers which consider prominent issues in bioethics. The three topics can be briefly stated as: 1) a refutation of the responsibility objection to abortion, 2) a rejection of the orthodox bioethical arguments attempting to justify removal of artificial nutrition and hydration from persistent vegetative state patients, and 3) a demand to revise the current orthodox criteria for determining death. The Responsibility Objection to Abortion is a common and prominent objection to abortion in general. The objection claims that a woman is responsible for the fetus growing inside her body as a result of her willing participation in sexual activity. I argue that the Responsibility Objection to Abortion fails to establish that a woman must provide care to her unborn fetus. I do so by examining the various iterations in which the responsibility objection has been presented and then identifying the particular conception of responsibility that each iteration of the objection must be utilizing in order to ground the particular version of the objection. My contention is that once examined in this manner I am able to demonstrate that each iteration of the objection is unable to establish an obligation to provide care on the part of a pregnant woman to her unborn fetus. Thus, the responsibility objection ceases to be a serious objection to a woman’s reproductive freedom. The second paper in this work considers arguments within the orthodox bioethical framework which seek to justify the removal of life-saving medical treatment (LSMT), especially in the form of artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH), from patients in persistent vegetative states (PVS). I first outline the orthodox bioethical framework which seemingly requires the continued feeding of PVS patients. I then focus upon a prominent case of removing ANH from a PVS patient, the case of Theresa Marie (Terri) Schiavo. Seven prominent arguments seeking to justify the removal of Terri’s ANH are considered. I conclude that each of these arguments fails to justify removing Terri Schiavo’s ANH within the established bioethical framework. Proponents of removing ANH from PVS patients such as Terri Schiavo will have to seek alternate approaches to defending their view which rejects the orthodox bioethical framework utilized throughout the discussion. In particular, so long as the right to life is based upon an individual being an innocent human being, removal of LSMT from PVS patients will remain unjustified. The demand for revised criteria for determining death arises due to the inadequacy of the orthodox criteria currently used to determine death, which are reducible to whole brain death. I argue that whole brain death is an inadequate criterion for the death of a human being within the framework of orthodox bioethics. I first consider the conflict between whole brain death and the plausible definitions of death the criterion of whole brain death is intended to reflect. Second, I consider the possibility that whole brain death can be justified as a criterion for death without the need for a definition of death. Third, I consider arguments that whole brain death is analogous to decapitation (long recognized as the death of the decapitated individual). Each of these three arguments for the continued use of whole brain death as the criterion of death are shown to be flawed. Utilizing these arguments presented against whole brain death I suggest revised criteria for determining death that are able to overcome the failures of whole brain death.Publication The Harmony Thesis and the Problem of Continence in Contemporary Virtue Ethics(University of Kansas, 2016-12-31) Schroeder, Nicholas; Frykholm, Erin; Frykholm, Erin; Tuozzo, Thomas; Dorsey, Dale; Eggleston, Ben; Shaw, MichaelContemporary virtue ethicists have largely followed Aristotle in accepting what Karen Stohr calls the harmony thesis. This thesis claims that a virtuous agent will not experience inner conflict or pain when acting. His reasons, desires, and actions will correspond and be in harmony with one another. A merely continent agent, on the other hand, is one who is said to perform the same action as the virtuous agent, but experiences inner conflict or pain in doing so. While the harmony thesis provides a useful criterion for demarcating virtue from continence, we can imagine cases where acting with conflict or pain is not only appropriate but necessary in the situation. In these cases the virtue/continence distinction cannot be easily drawn. This difficulty for the harmony thesis is better known as the problem of continence. In writing this dissertation I have three goals: show that the problem of continence poses a threat to the harmony thesis, offer a solution to the problem, and make that solution fit the needs of contemporary virtue ethics. In bringing about the first goal, I begin by introducing the harmony thesis and show that, in the contemporary context, the virtue/continence distinction takes on a much more expanded scope than espoused by Aristotle. For example, McDowell applies it to courage; Foot to honesty, charity, and justice; and Hursthouse to nearly all the moral virtues. While useful for contemporary virtue ethicists, this more robust conception makes the harmony thesis susceptible to problematic cases that Aristotle did not have to face. Chapter 2 explores a problematic case offered by Stohr involving a company owner who needs to fire several of her employees in order to save the company from ruin. Because acting rightly in the case requires an agent experience inner conflict or pain, only the continent agent can deliver. This puts the status of the virtuous agent in a compromising position: either be deemed morally lacking (in some way) compared to the continent agent or deny that the standard of virtue is sharply distinct from continence. In looking for a way out of the dilemma, Chapter 3 explores some attempts at a solution offered by Sarah Broadie, Susan Stark, David Carr, Geoffey Scarre, and Howard Curzer, concluding that none of the mentioned solutions adequately solve the problem of continence. The second goal of the dissertation is reached in three steps. I first return to the traditional account of continence defended by Aristotle. In a neo-Aristotelian spin drawing on Terence Irwin and Ursula Coope, I argue in Chapter 4 that continence should be interpreted as a failure of rationality rather than one of feeling. By redefining continence in this way, the real problem in Stohr's counterexample can be homed in on: the company owner who fires her employees with ease feels less pain than she should. The second step sets out to make sense of what it means to feel an inappropriate amount of pain. In Chapter 5, I propose that we turn to Aristotle's virtue of endurance to make sense of the defect. The third step uses the virtue of endurance to show that the defect in the company owner that acts with ease is that he is subject to the vice of hardness– feeling less pain than he should–not that virtue is inferior to continence in the case. Having accounted for Stohr's problem case, I address the other horn of the dilemma in Chapters 6 by offering an improved method for drawing the virtue/continence distinction. I do this by expanding and refining the concept of endurance. This culminates into a sophisticated account making use of temperance, continence, endurance, softness, and hardness. This meets my third goal by allowing the contemporary virtue ethicist to utilize continence and/or endurance in accommodating the wide variety of cases characteristically treated in the field.Publication Does a consistent soul-theory exclude the animals?(University of Kansas, 1929) Whitworth, Albert MitchellPublication Misunderstanding Davidson(University of Kansas, 2016-08-31) Rule, Martin Clifford; Bricke, John; Eggleston, Ben; Nutting, Eileen; Pye, Clifton L; Symons, JohnThe main aim of this dissertation is to offer, and to defend, an interpretation of Donald Davidson’s classic paper “Mental Events” which interpretation I take to be identical to Davidson’s intended interpretation. My contention is that many readers misunderstand this paper. My method for showing this will be, first, to give a brief summary of the surface structure, and the core concepts, of “Mental Events”. I will then begin to canvas exemplars of the main lines of (alleged) objection to what “Mental Events” has been supposed to contend. I intend to argue that these objections misunderstand either Davidson’s conclusions, or his arguments, or they require material additional to the position that Davidson actually lays out and argues for in “Mental Events” in order to follow. In the latter case I shall attempt to show that these additions are not contentions which Davidson shares by referencing further materials from Davidson’s work. My claim is that in describing anomalous monism Davidson sets up a genuinely novel position as regards the mental, the physical, and relations between them. This position allows genuine causal interaction between mental and physical events. It is consistent with the naturalistic view that every causal relation falls under maximally explanatory and predictive laws, under some description of the events in question. It also explains why mental descriptions of events cannot be nomologically reduced to physical descriptions. I shall be considering three exemplars of lines of argument against “Mental Events.” First, I shall consider the claim that the arguments of “Mental Events” require an unwarranted claim about nomologicality and causality as exemplified by G.E.M. Anscombe’s claim in “Causality and Determination”. Secondly, I shall examine the claim that the arguments of “Mental Events” entail epiphenomenalism concerning the mental, rather than the supposed novel position of anomalous monism, a claim presented in the arguments of Jaegwon Kim, across multiple papers. Lastly, I shall consider the argument that “Mental Events” commits a conceptual error in addressing what should be an empirical question (whether there are any social scientific laws) in a priori terms. This last objection I take to be exemplified by Lee McIntyre in his paper “Davidson and Social Scientific Laws”. My contention is that we dissolve the apparent threat of these objections by following Davidson in keeping clear which theses in “Mental Events” concern ontology, which theses concern explanations, and which theses concern descriptions.Publication The philosophy of Edwards(University of Kansas, 1928) Smith, Harry DenmanPublication The Natures of Pride and Shame(University of Kansas, 2016-05-31) Kittlaus, Jennifer Diane; Bricke, John J; Frykholm, Erin A; Maley, Corey J; Robins, Sarah K; Smith Fischer, IrisIn this dissertation, I explore the natures of emotional pride and shame. Using elements from Hume’s discussion of pride and humility in Book 2 of the Treatise, as well as Gabriele Taylor’s analysis of pride and shame in Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment, I argue against the view that pride and shame necessarily involve (global) self-evaluations. Put another way, I reject the view that pride and shame necessarily constitute one’s judging that one has experienced some gain or loss in status, respectively. Instead, I contend that they are best understood as constituting one’s being importantly satisfied or dissatisfied (respectively) with some (localized) aspect of an entity, whether oneself or an entity to which one stands in the (close) relation of ‘belonging.’ In addition, I emphasize that the evaluations involved in pride and shame are made in light of (or against the backdrop of) the emoter’s beliefs, desires, values, etc. I do not dispute the fact that others’ views may shape one’s own. Rather, I claim that experiences of pride and shame importantly reflect the emoter’s values, beliefs, desires, norms of expectations, etc. Finally, I stress that unless one is able to acknowledge that the entity in question (whether it be oneself or another) is capable of failing to meet one’s expectations, one cannot experience pride or shame. Notably, in the case of pride, unless one believes it is possible for the entity to fail to meet one's standards, one cannot truly feel satisfied that the entity in question met or exceeded one’s standards.Publication Parmenides' Theistic Metaphysics(University of Kansas, 2016-05-31) DeLong, Jeremy C.; Tuozzo, Thomas; Nutting, Eileen; Jenkins, Scott; Symons, John; Younger, JohnThe primary interpretative challenge for understanding Parmenides’ poem revolves around explaining both the meaning of, and the relationship between, its two primary sections: a) the positively endorsed metaphysical arguments which describe some unified, unchanging, motionless, and eternal “reality” (Aletheia), and b) the ensuing cosmology (Doxa), which incorporates the very principles explicitly denied in Aletheia. I will refer to this problem as the “A-D Paradox.” I advocate resolving this paradoxical relationship by reading Parmenides’ poem as a ring-composition, and incorporating a modified version of Palmer’s modal interpretation of Aletheia. On my interpretation, Parmenides’ thesis in Aletheia is not a counter-intuitive description of how all the world (or its fundamental, genuine entities) must truly be, but rather a radical rethinking of divine nature. Understanding Aletheia in this way, the ensuing “cosmology” (Doxa) can be straightforwardly rejected as an exposition of how traditional, mythopoetic accounts have misled mortals in their understanding of divinity. Not only does this interpretative view provide a resolution to the A-D Paradox, it offers a more holistic account of the poem by making the opening lines of introduction (Proem) integral to understanding Parmenides’ message. By setting forth its own unacceptable fiction, paralleling the elements of the Doxa in a ring-composition, the Proem simultaneously establishes the scope of the ensuing inquiry (divinity itself), and its target (traditional accounts of divinity). Maintaining Parmenides’ historical position as the “father of metaphysics,” the narrative that he advanced a strictly secular account of all reality is challenged. Instead, Parmenides is best understood as further advancing Xenophanes’ criticisms of traditional religion, an intellectual relationship which the ancient testimonia strongly supports.Publication The problem of immediate knowledge in the philosophy of Mr. Bertrand Russell and Mr. Bernard Bosanquet(University of Kansas, 1927) Selleck, George ArthurPublication Philosophical Methodology and its Implications for Experimental Philosophy(University of Kansas, 2015-05-31) Keil, Benjamin Allan; Eggleston, Ben; Bricke, John; Frykholm, Erin; Hirmas, Daniel; Tuozzo, ThomasSince most philosophers accord some role to intuitions in the practice of philosophy, my dissertation’s first paper addresses an important subsidiary question: Whose intuitions should be allowed to play a role in proper philosophical practice? My paper critiques Steven Hales’ view when he argues that the intuitions of philosophical laymen lack philosophical significance. I rebut the main arguments he gives in support of the “expertise defense” and then provide an Aristotelian-style argument in favor of the significance of lay philosophical intuitions. My second paper extends John Norton’s work into the realm of experimental philosophy. Norton argues that scientific thought experiments are arguments; I develop his work and show that his position entails that philosophical thought experiments are also arguments. I consider Thomson’s “Trolley Problem” and demonstrate that it contains an implicit argument, even if the argument’s conclusion is often omitted when presented in a classroom setting. Since my position entails that philosophical thought experiments are non-neutral devices for eliciting intuitions, I suggest two key implications for practitioners of experimental philosophy. Conflicting ethical intuitions are nothing new to philosophers, but a new way of resolving some of those intuitional conflicts is my third paper’s topic. AJ Ayer famously argues that unless some criterion for deciding between conflicting intuitions exists, appeals to intuition are worthless. I partially answer Ayer’s challenge by drawing on Steven Hales’ defense of foundationalism. Hales argues that at least one self-justifying proposition exists. If true, and if one self-justifying ethical proposition exists, I argue that this provides us a partial way towards answering Ayer’s challenge. Since self-justifying propositions must be justified a priori, where a conflict exists between an ethical intuition ultimately justified a priori and another ethical intuition ultimately justified a posteriori, the latter intuition should be rejected.Publication The Primitive Thesis: Defending a Davidsonian Conception of Truth(University of Kansas, 2015-05-31) Clarke, Justin Robert; Bricke, John; Dorsey, Dale; Nutting, Eileen; Symons, John; Pye, CliftonIn this dissertation I defend the claim, long held by Donald Davidson, that truth is a primitive concept that cannot be correctly or informatively defined in terms of more basic concepts. To this end I articulate the history of the primitive thesis in the 20th century, working through early Moore, Russell, and Frege, and provide improved interpretations of their reasons for advancing and (in the cases of Moore and Russell) eventually abandoning the primitive thesis. I show the importance of slingshot-style arguments in the work of Frege, Church, Davidson, and Gödel for resisting certain versions of the correspondence theory of truth. I argue that most slingshots fail to convincingly establish a collapsing conclusion, but that a Gödelian version of the slingshot is terminal to certain varieties of the correspondence theory of truth. I then provide a Davidsonian theory of truth and interpretation that is consistent with and makes use of the primitive thesis. Finally, I provide an account of predication, properties, and universals that I argue is both serviceable and consistent with Davidson’s overall program.Publication Kant's Knowledge of Unknowable Things in Themselves: An Examination of the Doctrine of Ignorance and the Non-spatiotemporality Thesis(University of Kansas, 2015-05-31) Bailey, Micah Joel; Jenkins, Scott; Bricke, John; Tuozzo, Thomas; Marquis, Donald; Muehlenhard, Charlene LThis dissertation is an examination of things in themselves as they are presented in the Critique of Pure Reason. Chapter 1 deals with Kant’s notion of a thing in itself generally. I argue that Kant uses ‘things in themselves’ in two ways: (1) to refer to logically possible entities that, if they exist, are ontologically distinct from appearances; (2) to signify the thought of empirical objects apart from sensibility. This follows from the fact that the notion of a thing in itself is a function of the understanding, but that our intellectual representations cannot relate to things in themselves. Chapters 2 and 3 attend to two theses of things in themselves: (1) they are unknowable; (2) they are non-spatiotemporal. Thesis (1) seems to render any judgment of things in themselves epistemically unjustifiable, thereby undermining Kant’s right to maintain either thesis (1) or (2). Thesis (2) seems to rest on an invalid argument and, consequently, fails to rule out the possibility that things in themselves are spatiotemporal (the traditional neglected alternative). Chapter 2 focuses on establishing that Kant is entitled to the Identity Thesis (i.e. if x is intuited a priori, then x is reducible to the representational content of that a priori intuition). I argue that the Identity Thesis secures a valid argument for thesis (2). Chapter 3 demonstrates that Kant’s argument for the transcendental ideality of space (and time) entails that our sensible representations cannot relate to things in themselves. Since neither our sensible, nor our intellectual, representations can relate to things in themselves, thesis (1) actually expresses a subtler claim: we cannot cognize things in themselves through our representations. I argue that this is neither self-undermining, nor does it undermine thesis (2); however, it does restrict us to a weak reading of thesis (2), such that it cannot rule out the possibility of a strong structural isomorphism obtaining between things in themselves and space and time (a new neglected alternative). I conclude by arguing that this new neglected alternative does not present Kant’s cognitive theory with any serious difficulties.